


CZECHOSLOVAKIA: LESSONS OF THE CRISIS



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LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE CRISIS DEVELOPMENT IN THE PARTY AND SOCIETY AFTER THE 13th CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Since April 1969, the Central Committee, its Presidium together with the Party active have made great efforts to explain to the Party, the working class and all citizens the causes of the crisis of our society, which in 1968 culminated in a counter-revolution.

Following up the evaluation and the conclusions adopted by the CC CPCz, especially after its sessions in September 1969 and January 1970, the Party bodies and organizations elaborated their own analyses which, together with the interviews with one-and-a-half million Party members in connection with the exchange of Party cards, helped to expose still further the activities of the rightist and anti-socialist forces in the Party and society.

The accumulated experience and findings enable us to generalize this collective knowledge of the Party. The CC CPCz is convinced that this document will become a lesson for the Party and will contribute to its further political-ideological and organizational unification, to the strengthening of its Marxist-Leninist character, to reinforcing its leading role and to the successful socialist development of our entire society.

I

The modern history of the Czech and Slovak nations was characterized by two basic currents: the fight for the social liberation of the working people and the struggle for the existence of our nations and their liberty. Their class and national aspects, internal and international aspects, were mutually overlapping and influencing one another.

Munich and the destruction of the Czechoslovak Republic proved that the ruling Czech bourgeoisie and the Slovak bourgeoisie, which was linked with it, sold out even the very existence of the Czechoslovak independent State for their own class interests of exploitation.

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This tragic experience of the broad masses of the people led to a deep change in their thinking and political attitudes. This resulted in a growth of the authority of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia which, in the course of the struggle against fascism and in defense of the Republic, proved to be the only consistent fighter for the class, social and national interests of the working people. By its principled policy, the heroism and selflessness of communists *in the national-liberation struggle at home and abroad, in which an important share was held by our Army Corps in the USSR and which culminated in the Slovak National Uprising and the uprising of the Czech people, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia won the generally acknowledged position of the leading political force.* At the same time, the authority of the USSR increased to an unparalleled extent and the traditionally warm relationship of our nations to the Soviet people, which stood the test during the critical period of Munich as the only faithful ally of Czechoslovakia, bore the brunt of the Second World War and had a decisive share in the defeat of Nazi Germany.

This development in Czechoslovakia, together with the shift in the international class forces as a result of the Soviet victories, created conditions in the country for a national democratic revolution. The liberation of our country by the Soviet army opened up the possibility for our working class to complete, in alliance with other working people, the struggle for the social and national liberation of the Czechoslovak people.

The consistent realization of the aims of the national democratic revolution and its gradual growth into a socialist revolution called forth ever more intensive resistance on the part of the bourgeoisie. The decision on the question of power, on the question of "who will come out on top" between the bourgeoisie and the working class became the basic question of further development: there was either the road to socialism or back to the rule of the bourgeoisie. The attempt of the bourgeoisie to carry out an open counter-revolutionary coup in February 1948 was part of a broadly conceived plan of international imperialism to revise the results of World War Two and to form an anti-communist and anti-Soviet front. However, the CPCz quickly and effectively rallied under its leadership the forces of the working class, the peasantry and other strata of the working people into counter-attack. The result of the course adopted by the Party, in which the People's Militia played an important role, was the crushing of the counter-revolutionary forces of the bourgeoisie.

The February victory was the culmination of the national and democratic revolution, the completion of the revolutionary struggle of the working class for the definitive adoption of the socialist road.

The internal prerequisite for this was a strong, battle-hardened, ideologically and organizationally united Communist Party headed by Kl. Gottwald. The Party succeeded in applying in a principled way and creatively the Leninist strategy and tactics of the fight for power under the concrete historical conditions of our country. The external prerequisite of success consisted in the fact that the ties of alliance with the USSR prevented imperialist intervention.

February 1948 fully opened the road to the construction of socialism in our country. A basic prerequisite of socialist construction was to strengthen the power of the working people headed by the working class and the Communist Party in such a way that the new power might fulfil all functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This made it necessary to liquidate the remaining power positions of the bourgeoisie and to create a new type of socialist state and a new type of socialist democracy. The decisive task of the Party at the stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat was to ensure the construction of the material and technical basis of socialism and a consistent growth in the cultural and living standard of the people; to protect the unity of the Party and the purity of its Marxist-Leninist teachings; to wage an incessant political and ideological struggle against the influence of the defeated bourgeoisie, against the wavering of the petty-bourgeois strata and the pressure of the imperialist world; to constantly deepen the alliance with the Soviet Union and other peoples' democratic countries. This was the bequest of the February victory, which found its expression in the general line of socialist construction in Czechoslovakia laid down by the Ninth Congress of the CPCz in 1949.

This general line was based on the general laws of the construction of socialism, on Leninist ideas and the generalized experience of the CPSU, and applied them creatively under the concrete conditions of our country. It corresponded to the stage of development attained, the conditions and needs of our society, the aims of the revolutionary struggle of the working class and the interests of the broad strata of working people. It evoked great revolutionary enthusiasm, the political and working initiative of the broad masses.

Socialist construction in Czechoslovakia led to historic changes in the social and economic structure of our society and brought remarkable successes in the political, economic and cultural life of our people.

The suppressed and exploited working class became the ruling class. Thus, in Czechoslovakia, too, the age-old dream of the working people came true—exploitation of man by man was removed. Under the leadership of the CPCz, our people became the conscious creator of its own destiny.

In the economic sphere, socialist relations of production fully

prevailed. In order to strengthen and develop them even further, a powerful material and technical basis of socialism was built. As compared with pre-war level, the national income increased in 1969 by 350 per cent.

The revolutionary changes were especially expressed by a rapid growth of industrial production, which was more than six times as high as before the war. The industrialization of Slovakia brought about a fundamental change, by her transformation from an agrarian to an industrially advanced country. Backwardness, poverty and emigration have been eliminated. Today, Slovakia alone produces more than the entire pre-Munich Republic.

A fundamental change has been achieved in the face and the life of our villages. Socialist production relations prevailed in agriculture as well. A new class has emerged—the class of co-operative farmers whose material standing, cultural standard and social security are incomparable to the unsatisfactory position of the private farmer. Thus, one of the most difficult tasks of socialist revolution was fulfilled.

These facts resulted in a fundamental change in the living conditions of the working people and their prospects. Unemployment has been eliminated. Every citizen of the country is guaranteed the right to work, to all-round health services and old-age pensions. In our socialist homeland, social security has been created for the working people, which is one of the main prerequisites of contented human life.

During the existence of the socialist system in our country, the living standard of all classes and strata of society has markedly increased. Working time has been reduced to five days a week.

The level of education among the people, and the cultural standard of our nations and nationalities in general, increased because the age-old dream of the working class and the working people—to ensure the right to education for all—began to be fulfilled in our country as well. Consistent and generous care of the socialist state for science made it possible to develop scientific and applied research in many fields to an outstanding and often even a world standard. The broad strata of the people were given access to the best and most progressive cultural values.

By its economic potential, growth of production, living standard, development of culture, science and education, and by its social achievements for the working people, our Republic reached one of the top rungs on the world ladder of economically advanced countries.

The people are taking an ever more active part in the administration and management of the socialist state. Decisive changes have been achieved and all-round prerequisites were created for a

Marxist-Leninist solution of the nationality question. The Czechs and Slovaks developed into advanced socialist nations and became part of the vanguard of world progress and peace. Marxism-Leninism, as the most progressive ideology of the present world, has become the determining ideology of society.

The results attained in socialist construction are proof that our working people, led by the CPCz, have successfully mastered the complicated revolutionary task of socialist construction. The selfless and untiring effort of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia, members of the older and the rising generations, resulted in a work which belongs to the most glorious feats in the history of our nations. This provides a guarantee, a basis and starting-point for the future advance of our socialist society.

The alliance and cooperation with the socialist countries, and especially with the Soviet Union, gives our people not only security against the threat of aggression and blackmail on the part of imperialism. It ensures our nations state and national security and sovereignty and creates all-round prerequisites for their political, economic and cultural development. It protects our national economy against shocks of crises occurring on the capitalist market. The Soviet Union supplies not only the necessary raw materials and equipment, but also provides a permanent and certain market for our products and assists selflessly with its specialists and experience. Without this cooperation and assistance, socialist construction in Czechoslovakia would be impossible to achieve.

The experience gained by our people, under the leadership of the CPCz, in socialist construction confirmed that the principles of socialism are also fully valid for countries which embarked upon the road to socialism at the stage of an industrially advanced economy. In these countries, too, socialism gives the working class and all the working people qualitatively higher, otherwise unattainable possibilities of progress.

The road of building socialism was not an easy one, and was accompanied by obstacles and difficulties. During the intensive and complicated development which our society went through, and in which the Party and working class were only learning to master the art of management and ruling, there were obstacles and tragic errors. Besides difficulties stemming from the novelty and complexity of the tasks, socialist construction was also accompanied by certain errors of a subjective character. They appeared in the form of self-satisfaction, inconsistent application of Leninist principles in the life and work of the Party, insufficient generalization of practice and the accumulated experience of the masses, neglect of a class approach to social problems, skipping stages of development, violation of principles of democratic centralism and inner-

Party democracy. The weakening of political and ideological work blunted the fight against bourgeois ideologies, petty-bourgeois tendencies and ideological subversion. This logically influenced the weakening of the ties between the Party and the masses of the working people.

The faults and shortcomings in this country were all the more serious in that great weight in the social structure of our society was wielded by numerous petty-bourgeois strata in the villages and among the town population. These strata represented a significant political current with great tradition, strong organization and a clear-cut petty-bourgeois ideology of nationalism, Masarykism and social-democratism which was deeply rooted and also penetrated certain parts of the working class. In Slovakia, a considerable role was played by religious survivals which were misused by Ludakist fascism. These strata were for scores of years politically and culturally oriented upon the West. All this created in the country fertile ground for the infiltration and application of opportunist and revisionist tendencies.

The discussion preceding the 13th Party Congress pointed out many shortcomings and mistakes which had to be solved, but the Party leadership did not manage consistently to generalize the experience gained by the Party in the preceding development and to adopt such conclusions in the political sphere and as regards cadres which would make it possible to eliminate these shortcomings. In spite of this, the resolution of the 13th Congress of the CPCz in 1966 oriented the Party on the whole in the correct direction. Its conclusions provided broad possibilities for a consistent implementation of the leading role of the Party and of Leninist methods in the direction of the Party and society.

However, the resolution of the 13th Congress was not thoroughly elaborated and, on the contrary, in many cases there was a retreat from it. This fact was made use of by rightist and revisionist forces. They formed into a gradually growing current which was coming into existence long before the 13th Congress from among the ranks of petty-bourgeois elements and representatives of the defeated bourgeoisie. These elements penetrated also the Party, especially the ideological sector and the mass media of communication. They were joined by people who lost their head in face of difficulties and faith in the revolutionary perspective, by various "theoreticians" who went over from extreme dogmatism to revisionism.

The internal onset of the rightist forces is closely linked with the ideological centers of anti-communism throughout the world. Their long-term activities, as well as methods of ideological subversion and of various psychological operations were purposefully concentrated on the gradual erosion of all fundamental values of

socialism in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR), and on strengthening the influence of revisionism in the internal organism of the Party. These centers applied common tactics against the CSSR, making use of her internal weakening which resulted from the growth of certain crisis phenomena within the CPCz.

The aim of these anti-communist circles was to revive the remnants of bourgeois views, to evoke illusions about capitalism, to promote nationalism and anti-Soviet moods, to throw doubt upon the leading role of the Party and the leading position of the working class, the class conception of the revolutionary struggle and principles of socialism in general.

The Party was not sufficiently prepared and armed to meet this concentrated, well organized, co-ordinated and controlled attack of the internal and external revisionist and rightist opportunist forces. The danger of the penetration of rightist opportunism and revisionism was under-rated, ideological work was marked by inadmissible defensiveness and tolerance. The threat of ideological subversion was actually often pointed out by words, but this was not followed by concrete steps. The education of Party members and other working people in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism was weakened. Gradually, the Party was being ideologically disarmed. Theoretical work in the Party was for many years neglected and suffered from a superficial formalistic approach to ideological work among Party members. Even such theoretical institutes of the Party as the Historical Institute of the CPCz, the Party College, the Institute of Political Sciences were long before 1968 active bearers of many revisionist conceptions. Part of the blame for this state of affairs lies with J. Hendrych and V. Koucky who in the past period were responsible for this section of Party work. Greatest damage in this field was caused by V. Slavik and C. Cisar who fully opened the door to right opportunism.

A salient open attempt to establish a revisionist anti-Party and anti-socialist platform were the addresses organized by the rightist group of writers around A. J. Liehm, P. Kohout, M. Kundera, K. Kosik, L. Vaculik and J. Prochazka at the 4th Writers' Congress, with the aim of securing for this platform public support.

The sound Marxist-Leninist current in the Party was aware of the gravity of the situation. It made sincere efforts to achieve a solution of the shortcomings, demanded their rectification and was ready to devote all its forces to it. It expressed the views of the decisive majority of the Party. However, the Party leadership did not understand and support this sincere effort, and did not put itself at the head of this current.

Although there was even within the leadership a differentiation of views, the political course was determined primarily by the

standpoints of A. Novotny who had no feeling at all for conceptual work, indiscriminately rejected critical voices and did not differentiate between well-meant criticism and rightist attacks. He frequently adopted a sharper stand against those forces which tried to create a sound situation in the Party than against rightist elements. Instead of putting himself at the head of the Marxist-Leninist current, he objectively obstructed efforts of the Party to achieve a creative application of the conclusions of the 13th Congress, ideological and action unity and a strengthening of the leading role of the Party. Many conclusions of the Central Committee and the Presidium were weakened by A. Novotny's inconsistency and one-sided interpretation, whereby he was throwing them into doubt although he had earlier expressed agreement with them. A. Novotny's faults stemmed from some of his personal qualities, from his violation of collective leadership, his conceit, subjectivism, megalomania and suspicion of people, and they were no doubt also caused by the uncritical approach on the part of some of his closest collaborators. This is why the efforts to find a way out of the situation and to activate the Party concentrated on the question of his departure from the leading Party function.

In the course of the February, May, September and October sessions of the CC CPCz in 1967, the contradictions which were until then smouldering below the surface, came openly to the fore at the supreme Party forum. However, in these contradictions, justified criticism of the situation, and partly also of its causes, was already mingled with opportunist speeches of certain members of the Central Committee against the fundamental principles of the Party and socialism.

The plenary session of the CC CPCz of October 1967, on the position and the role of the Party, became an important stage. A great role in the preparation of this session was played by a broad, representative survey of the attitudes of the Party public, in which around 600 basic Party organizations expressed their views on topical questions of Party work. The results of this survey contained grave warnings, drawing attention to contradictions between proclaimed aims and achieved results, to manifestations of bureaucracy, to the suppression of inner-Party democracy, to the low level of discipline and growing passivity of communists, to the insufficient contact of the leading bodies with basic organizations, to the inconsistent solution of economic problems. At the same time, the results of this survey rejected the denigration of the history and work of the Party, petty-bourgeois negativism and anti-Soviet attacks and revisionism. They were an open and sharp criticism of the Party leadership, but at the same time the expression of the will and determination of the Party to overcome the accumulated difficulties.

At the October plenum of 1967, the contradictions existing within the Central Committee as regards the evaluation of the situation and the choice of solution came already openly to the fore. By his speech at the plenum, A. Novotny set against himself the great majority of members of the Central Committee and brought the situation to such a head that changes in the leadership could not be delayed. The Central Committee broached but did not fully solve the fundamental problems concerning Party policy, the activities of the Central Committee and its bodies.

At the December plenum, the majority of Central Committee members criticized A. Novotny's methods of work and ways of management, and demanded a critical and self-critical analysis of the policy and the work of the Central Committee, the Presidium and the Secretariat of the CC CPCz.

The discussion centered around the situation in the Party and the necessity to take principled measures against shortcomings in the implementation of the resolution of the 13th Party Congress, including A. Novotny's departure from the function of First Secretary.

The tenacity with which A. Novotny defended his personal position resulted in the fact that the forces and the attention of the Central Committee concentrated primarily on the solution of the question of Party leadership. This resulted, inter alia, in the fact that the plenum did not expose in time the platform of those members of the Central Committee who in the discussion and assessment of the situation and the further course of the Party proceeded essentially from anti-Party, revisionist positions (O. Sik, V. Slavik, F. Vodslon, J. Smrkovsky and others).

The interruption of the deliberations of the December plenum without concrete conclusions, and its postponement to the beginning of January, intensified to the extreme the tension not only within the Central Committee and the Party active, but also within the entire Party and society.

It was only when A. Novotny realized that in spite of all maneuvering and attempts he could not gain support of the majority in the Central Committee, that after extensive, open and often contradictory six-day discussions he accepted at the January plenum the proposed solution and was in accordance with the Party Rules released from the function of First Secretary of the CC CPCz.

After long deliberations and controversial proposals, the Central Committee unanimously elected to the function of First Secretary A. Dubcek. This election was a compromise solution. Many actually knew some of his shortcomings, but his choice was influenced by the then existing relations within the leadership as well as by the effort to select a candidate with whose election it would be possible

to achieve unity. The proposal to elect him was submitted on behalf of the Presidium, on behalf of the consultative group (which was created by the plenum from among representatives of regional organizations because the Presidium itself could not reach any conclusion on this question), and in his own name, by A. Novotny. The Central Committee further supplemented the Presidium by the election of certain new members.

The plenum adopted a political resolution which unequivocally espoused the conclusions of the 13th Party Congress, and again emphasized that we are part of the world socialist system and our firm unity with the Soviet Union. It stressed the need to deepen the unity of the Party, to eliminate mistakes and shortcomings, and to strengthen the leading role of the Party, the need to observe the Leninist norms, to strengthen the bonds between the Czechs and Slovaks by consistent implementation of Leninist principles in nationality policy, to solve problems of the national economy and other tasks designed to ensure the realization of the 13th Congress.

However, the January plenum also showed grave contradictory tendencies. The forces proceeding from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and which relied on the resolution of the 13th Congress and defended the necessity to continue along the set line, endeavored to find an answer to topical questions, to eliminate shortcomings and errors of the past and to mobilize the whole Party to activity which would correspond to the matured problems. On the other hand, however—as has been confirmed by further development—the rightist revisionist group formed already at the January plenum, a group which under the cloak of the rectification of mistakes, was striving for a revision of the general line of the Party, for the disruption of the ideological and organizational principles of the Party structure, for the destruction of the political structure of socialist society to the benefit of petty-bourgeois spontaneity, and for a change in the foreign political orientation of the CSSR.

The new Party leadership was faced by the enormously serious task and historic responsibility before its own Party, the people and the international communist movement:

- to utilize and transform the spontaneous agreement of the Party and the people with the solution of the January plenum for developing broad activity aimed at overcoming the obstacles obstructing the further development of socialism in the CSSR;

- not to permit any abuse of the efforts of the Party to rectify shortcomings, and to wage an offensive ideological and political struggle against opportunist, revisionist and anti-socialist views, tendencies and forces. This principled orientation was all the more urgent as there existed the threat that the overcoming of the grave shortcomings of the Novotny leadership—unless accompanied by a resolute struggle against revisionism—would lead to a growth of

the rightist danger which had already made itself noticeable in certain speeches at the January plenum;

—to strengthen even further our ties with the socialist countries, especially with the Soviet Union, so that Czechoslovakia might be a firm and reliable link of the world socialist system.

The results of the January plenum were fundamentally an expression of the necessity to solve the matured crisis in the CPCz and to remove from the activities of the Party, and especially from its leadership, that which prevented the Party and society from rising to new activity, to a new upsurge. This applied in particular to the consistent implementation of Leninist principles in the management of the Party and society, and to the necessity to react in time to new phenomena in all spheres of social life, which emerged as a result of development. This was the spirit in which the results of the January plenum were received by the overwhelming majority of the Party and our people.

II.

After January 1968, it became, however, evident that the new Party leadership, headed by A. Dubcek, was, in view of its heterogeneity, political disunity and overall weakness, incapable of fulfilling this task. The position of the Presidium of the CC CPCz was from the very beginning weakened by the fact that its members continued to include certain comrades who were responsible for past shortcomings and deformations, as well as by the fact that those elected to it included J. Spacek and J. Boruvka who very shortly proved to be exponents of the right wing. However, the decisive fact was—as has been shown by further developments—that especially A. Dubcek did not have the prerequisites for grasping the complicated character of the situation and the risk connected with the change in the leadership under political and economic conditions existing at that time in the Party and society.

His indecision and hesitancy resulted in the fact that the Party leadership did not rely on the confidence of the overwhelming majority of members of the CC CPCz and on the support of the majority of communists, and did not put itself at the head of the Marxist-Leninist forces which had been striving already for many years for an improvement in the work of the Party. The great potential source of energy for the development of socialism, represented by the initiative and the hopes which the January plenum evoked in the people, was wasted and even misused by the rightist forces. Instead of taking the initiative and assuming firm control of developments, the Party leadership permitted spontaneity from the first moments and made possible the organized onset of the right wing.

The Party did not have a clear line and an explicit directive for its further course in the decisive spheres. It is characteristic that the Party leadership did not even issue a directive for the preparation of the annual plenary membership meetings and of the district conferences. This gradually resulted in the fact that the leading Party bodies ceased to apply the principles of democratic centralism even in the sphere of cadre policy. They did not control the lower Party bodies and the Party apparatus and, on the contrary, permitted a weakening of Party discipline and of all organizing activities of the Party and the State.

In the first weeks after the January plenum, the right wing examined the ground and possibilities, rallied forces and allies, cautiously advanced and determined its tactics. When it saw the indecision of the leadership and found out that it could turn A. Dubcek by various pressures and adulation into its shield, it began to enshroud him with an atmosphere of messianism and went over to a broadly organized attack. In February and March, it already organized—without energetic resistance and intervention on the part of leading Party bodies—a number of its public actions and endeavored to disorientate the Party and other working people by distorted information on the results of the January plenum. In this, it made use mainly of the fact that the resolution of the January plenum of the CC CPCz was not published.

At that time, the most active representatives of the right wing within the CC CPCz, O. Sik, F. Kriegel, J. Spacek, V. Slavik, J. Smrkovsky, F. Vodslon, J. Boruvka, V. Prchlik and others began to present to the public a revisionist interpretation of the meaning of the January plenum and to give themselves the false aura of the "Men of January." These speeches, which violated the principles of democratic centralism, became at the same time the impulse for a campaign unleashed by the mass media of communication. In these media the right wing had already before January important positions which it further strengthened in this period and turned them into the main weapon of attacks against the Party and the socialist state. This was made possible, inter alia, by the fact the leadership of the Party and State essentially abandoned their management and control.

By its domination of the decisive mass media the right wing virtually secured the possibility of monopolizing the interpretation of the meaning and the aims of the January plenum in its own spirit. At the same time, it gave its campaign the semblance of support of a "new" policy of the Party, as if it were a fight for a "new" and "better" socialism. This made it also possible that apart from people who had never accepted socialism and apart from open enemies of the system, a great number of honest citizens rallied around these slogans.

The right wing took advantage of A. Novotny's great unpopularity, of the fact that he bore the main responsibility for the mistakes of the past period. It made also skillful use of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Party and society in principle rejected a return to the methods used by A. Novotny. It employed his attempts to defend his standpoint for creating a psychosis of a threat on the part of the "conservatives" as the main danger for the post-January development. At the same time, it put the label of conservative on everyone who defended the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

This development evoked ever growing concern not only within the Party but also among the broad public. The great number of letters sent by Party members and the standpoints they voiced at membership meetings, as well as the resolutions from Party bodies and organizations which were at that time sent to the Central Committee of the Party, showed that communists, but also many non-Party members, did not agree with the campaign aimed at discrediting the Party and at disparaging the results achieved, nor with the growing anti-Soviet attacks. They demanded clear-cut words and deeds from the Party leadership, which would put an end to the growing anti-Party and anti-socialist attacks.

An open measuring of strength with the rightist opportunist forces within the Party took place at the district conferences held in March. The attempt of the right wing to secure control of the key positions in the district Party committees failed in view of the resistance put up by the sound forces. However, the right wing immediately organized a campaign in the mass media in which it labelled every opponent as a "conservative" and adversary of the January plenum, and stepped up the atmosphere of intimidation. Under the slogan that "a new policy can be pursued only with new people," honest and tested functionaries were removed from their functions and were replaced by people who had mostly stood aloof from the construction of socialism. Certain functionaries of the pre-January period really proved to be incapable of coping with their task and should have been justly replaced, but under the pressure of the right wing, functionaries were being "shot off" ever more frequently merely because they took a stand in defending the Party and socialism.

Around the factional core of the revisionist rightist forces within the Party there rallied an opposition current which gradually penetrated into an ever greater number of organizations and was creating its own political platform and organizational structure. The right wing gradually occupied important positions at all levels by placing in them its own people or those who, for various reasons, went over to it and capitulated before it. It skillfully applied combined pressure from above—from the leading bodies of the

Party and the State—and from below by means of the mass media, by organizing meetings, various resolutions, signature campaigns and so on, which were passed off as the standpoint of the Party and the working people, although they were often inspired by small groups or individuals. The failure of the Party leadership to give direction to Party bodies resulted in the fact that part of the functionaries did not fully discern the intentions of the rightists, while another part was withdrawing from the battle. This enabled the right wing, during the second stage of the district conferences, to penetrate by means of gross violation of the Party Rules into important positions of the district links of the Party. In view of the fact that the forces faithful to Marxism-Leninism did not get support from the leading bodies of the Party and, with a few exceptions, did not even have the possibility of stating their views in public, they gradually found themselves on the defensive and in isolation.

Since the leading bodies of the CPCz virtually ceased to control the Party and the mass media, the trend of political development in the country was being increasingly determined not by the Party leadership but by the right wing. The fact that the attack against the foundations of socialism was led by people who mostly held a Party card, was taken by the public as if there were a clash between those who were in support of January and those who were against it, between "progressive" and "conservative" communists, between those who wanted to improve the functioning of society and those who were defending outdated methods. This wrong picture was continuously instilled into the minds of the people by the mass media. This was the reason why they gradually managed to deceive a rather wide range of the public and to obscure the fact that this was in reality a class struggle, an attack against the very existence of socialism. In this way, rightist propaganda succeeded in misleading even numerous groups of honest working people in our country. It was also considerably successful among a relatively large part of the intelligentsia, especially its humanitarian part.

The logic of political struggle induced the right wing to make even more aggressive efforts to recruit as its ally against the Party those political forces from among the ranks of the former petty-bourgeoisie which had been until then balancing on the fringe of socialist society, and even openly anti-communist forces. This resulted in the creation of a bloc of rightist revisionist and anti-socialist forces. Its individual components actually differed in their ideology and tactics, but they united in the decisive fight against the Party and the alliance with the Soviet Union.

Imperialism was in this way given the opportunity to realize in the CSSR, in the spirit of its global strategy and tactics, the aims

which it had been elaborating over a long period against the socialist countries. This is why this bloc, under whose general onslaught the managing structure of the Party, the socialist state and society began to gradually disintegrate, found all-round political, moral and material support from the imperialist forces.

Czechoslovakia has already since February 1948 been the object of broadly based political and ideological subversion on the part of imperialism which, however, did not yield the expected distinct results in a situation when the Party held developments firmly in its hands. After the rightist opportunist and anti-socialist forces in this country started to openly attack the basic principles of the Party and socialism and when their disruptive activities ceased to meet with active resistance, external imperialist activity, too, could pass over to a vigorous onslaught. This was also the essence of the sharp class struggle which was not by far based only on the historic specificities of our society, but was primarily the expression of long-term interest and intensive efforts of world reaction to secure control over Czechoslovakia. These activities were also joined by the post-February emigration, centered around the notorious Pavel Tigrid whose conceptions of a "gradual weakening" of the structure of the socialist system and other "theories" on the necessity to internally disrupt the leading role of the Party, provided the bloc of rightist revisionists and anti-socialist forces with the ideological weapons with which it identified itself and which it put purposefully into life.

The April 1968 session of the CC CPCz showed already quite openly the weakness and disunity of the post-January leadership as well as the shift of power in favor of the right wing.

In the discussion at the plenum, the Marxist-Leninist forces of the Central Committee of the CPCz drew attention to the negative developments. They succeeded in having Ludvik Svoboda, a great patriot, hero of the anti-fascist struggle and outstanding champion of the friendship and alliance with the USSR, nominated to the Presidency, rather than the candidates of the right forces, J. Smrkovsky and C. Cisar. However, when the Presidium and Secretariat of the CC, the government and other state bodies were being reorganized, people who later acted as exponents of the right forces, were nominated and approved for decisive posts in the bodies of power, for the posts of chairman of the government and chairmen of the National Front and the National Assembly.

The resolution of the April plenum, as a matter of fact, warned against the danger of spontaneity in the post-January development, but the fundamental questions—the unity and capacity of the Party to act, the exposure of the rightist danger as well as the proclamation of a resolute fight against it—remained unsolved. The Action Program, which was approved by the April plenum, already reflect-

ed the intensified disruptive activities of the right wing within the Party. It contains non-Marxist formulations about the role of the Party, the state and socialist society, about the so-called partnership conception of the National Front, about the management of the economy and culture, as well as other theses of an opportunist and revisionist character. It is a document which is a considerable step back in the theoretical, political and organizational sphere as compared with similar Party documents of a program character which had been adopted by the Party in the past. *The Central Committee, therefore, considers the Action Program to be an incorrect and invalid document which cannot be used as a basis in the theoretical activities and the practical policy of the Party.*

Both at the April plenum and in public, the right wing attempted to express non-confidence in the CC CPCz. At the same time it raised the demand for convening an extraordinary, so-called "cadre" congress with the aim of taking hold of the supreme body of the Party. This demand was, however, resolutely rejected by the great majority of the Central Committee.

After the April plenum, the regional Party conferences came to the forefront of political struggle. The Presidium of the Central Committee had again the opportunity to rally at these conferences the forces of the Party and to take the initiative into its own hands. However, this opportunity was not used through the fault of the rightist group in the leadership. It was typical that no uniform and clear directive was issued either for the preparation of the regional conferences or for the speeches of the heads of the Central Committee delegations. The right wing intended to use these conferences to gain further positions and to secure a majority in support of its demand for convening an extraordinary congress. However, in spite of all its efforts, the demand for convening an extraordinary congress was directly supported only by the City Conference in Prague, where A. Dubcek, O. Cernik and J. Smrkovsky made ineffective speeches and did not contrive to successfully defend the resolution of the Central Committee plenum, and by the South Moravian regional conference which was tricked by Spacek, who presented a distorted interpretation of the standpoint held by the Central Committee. Most resolute opposition to the standpoint of the right wing was expressed by the regional conferences in Slovakia.

The right wing therefore continued to broaden the front of its onslaught on Party bodies, on the decisive components of the Party and state apparatus, on social organizations and on ideological life. The oppositional, so-called second, center in the Party, which was formed on the basis of the City Committee of the CPCz in Prague, coordinated and unified organizationally, politically and

ideologically the activities of various opposition groups, determined united tactics and the method of the anti-Party struggle. Certain members of the Presidium, the Secretariat and the plenum of the Party Central Committee, such as, for instance, F. Kriegel, J. Smrkovsky, J. Spacek, C. Cisar, V. Slavik, O. Sik, V. Prchlik, Z. Mlynar, F. Vodslon, B. Simon, J. Boruvka, M. Vaculik also were, or later became, representatives of this center. Rightist groupings emerged also in the regions and districts. Their structure was at the same time built up in such a way as to comprise and facilitate the influence of the right wing in important Party bodies and significant components of its apparatus, in decisive centers of the social sciences, in the mass media, in the sphere of education, science and culture, as well as in important links of the state apparatus.

The final aims of the rightist and anti-socialist forces in Slovakia were identical with the designs of the right wing in the Czech regions. However, in the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, in the regional and district committees of the Communist Party of Slovakia, as well as among the intelligentsia there formed forces which waged a persistent struggle against the activities of the rightist and anti-socialist bloc. The rightist forces in Slovakia did not, until August 1968, fully manage to form their ranks upon an organized and all-embracing platform. This was also due to the sound core in the Party leadership headed by comrade Vasil Bilak who in the function of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia took a stand based unequivocally on positions of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, openly exposed the aims of the rightist and anti-socialist forces, defended the positions of the Party and our ties of alliance with the Soviet Union.

In spite of this, a dangerous situation emerged gradually also in Slovakia; just as in other parts of the Republic, this situation was characterized by the activities of rightist and anti-socialist forces.

All these deep political shifts throughout the Republic also found their expression in the May Day celebrations, which in a number of places lost the internationalist class character and changed into a motley mixture of most varied political currents of rightist and anti-socialist forces. At the May Day parades, especially in Prague, pronouncedly anti-communist forces already made their appearance with their slogans, forces represented primarily by counter-revolutionary organizations like KAN and K231.

At the beginning of May this growing danger was already so evident that when the Presidium of the CC CPCz held a general discussion on the political situation in the country, on May 7 and 8, even its rightist part was under the pressure of arguments of the Marxist-Leninist core forced to admit that the Party and social-

ism were threatened by grave danger as a result of the activities of the rightist, anti-socialist and anti-Soviet forces. The state-wide conference of leading regional and district secretaries, which was convened to check the correctness of these conclusions, not only confirmed this but showed the situation in the country in an even sharper light. A few days later, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia expressed in the same spirit its own standpoint which, however, A. Dubcek did not permit to be published.

However, in the preparation of the May plenum of the CC CPCz the right wing, too, exerted considerable activity in order to thwart its aims. The group of the Prague center elaborated a complex rightist conception which was in contradiction with the evaluation and the conclusions of the Presidium, and in this way passed over to factional activities. This conception was presented at a conference of leading regional and district Party secretaries on behalf of the City Party Committee in Prague by B. Simon. Under the demand of creating a Czech Communist Party and a Czech National Council which would be controlled by the rightist forces, it was aimed at complete seizure of power in the Party and the state.

In order to mislead and thus also temporarily to win over the working class, the majority of which was until then resisting the rightist demagogy, O. Sik—without the knowledge and consent of Party and state bodies—came out with the demand to form councils of working people. This proposal was part of the conception aimed at the destruction of the managing economic structure and at crushing the socialist system of planning, at creating a counter-balance to and the weakening of the positions of Party organizations in enterprises. At the same time, there was instigated a wave of social demagogy and unrestrained pressures for increases in wages which were forced regardless of the results in production, frequently under the threat of wild-cat strikes. All this called forth an inflationary wave and the threat of disruption in the economy. At the same time, it was demagogically declared that the only salvation from economic catastrophe can be a large loan in dollars.

At the May 1968 plenum of the CC CPCz, the gravity of the situation was reflected even in the opening speech of A. Dubcek. Although he presented the conclusions of the Presidium of the CC CPCz in a diluted form, he was forced to admit the existence of efforts aimed at the moral discrediting of the whole Party and to warn against the danger "that we should not open up scope to non-socialist or even anti-revolutionary forces."

The resolution of the May plenum noted that the main danger for the Party had become the rightist danger which, however, was narrowed down merely to the threat from anti-socialist and anti-communist forces operating outside the Party. Although the dis-

cussion at the Central Committee brought about clashes with the rightist opportunists, the role of the rightist forces in the Party was not exposed in A. Dubcek's concluding speech nor in the resolution. In spite of these shortcomings, the conclusions of the plenum could have brought positive results if the Party leadership had consistently implemented them.

The May plenum also brought about a change in the attitude to the question of convening an extraordinary congress. This change was based on the intention of the Marxist-Leninist forces to take the initiative into their own hands, by speeding up the convocation of the congress. The prerequisite of this would, of course, have been a united and principled course of the entire Party leadership, which was not achieved.

Following the May plenum, the activity of the Marxist-Leninist forces increased. Hundreds of thousands of Party members and functionaries supported the resolution of the May plenum at actives and meetings, and demanded resolute measures in defense of socialism. The attempts to achieve a positive turn in developments culminated in the state-wide active of the People's Militia in Prague, which was attended by more than 11,000 members. This active was the expression of the fact that the People's Militia as a whole had not, at that time, succumbed to the onslaught of the right wing, that it continued to adhere to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and friendship with the Soviet Union and that it was determined to defend the cause of socialism.

In the period of preparations for the 14th Extraordinary Party Congress, which was characterized by an atmosphere of hysteria, intimidation and terror, a decisive struggle was waged for the Party between the Marxist-Leninist forces and the right wing.

The open and co-ordinated onslaught of the reactionary forces found its expression in the publication of the counter-revolutionary platform of 2,000 words, which was a forthright instigation to violent actions and to the destruction of the socialist system. This counter-revolutionary appeal went farthest at the same time in stirring up hatred against the Soviet Union, and even expressed a public threat against our allies of armed conflict.

The deliberate publication of this counter-revolutionary pamphlet on the eve of the district conferences influenced their course and the election of delegates to the regional conferences. In spite of the negative standpoint of the Presidium of the Central Committee, which, however, its rightist members—A. Dubcek, J. Smrkovsky, F. Kriegel and also O. Cernik—immediately sabotaged, roughly half of the district conferences in the Czech regions came out in support of the 2000 words.

In the period of the extraordinary regional Party conferences, the full transition of the right wing to open factional activities

became already markedly evident. The second center in the Party endeavored to isolate the leftist forces in the existing Central Committee, and by sending down instructions to the regions to predetermine the results of elections of delegates to the Congress and the composition of the new Central Committee. It managed to achieve that the delegates to the 14th extraordinary Party Congress included many rightist opportunists, nationalists, and wavering members of the Party. Merely 17.4 per cent of the delegates were workers, which is without parallel in the history of the CPCz. In this way the right wing created conditions for seizing power at the Congress and for legalizing its aims and intentions.

The anti-communist and anti-socialist forces organized open demonstrations, provocations and actions of a clearly anarchistic character. They intensified the nationalist, anti-Soviet wave, especially in connection with the staff maneuvers of the allied troops in Czechoslovakia. They made efforts to achieve the disbandment of the People's Militia.

The chauvinistic campaign against the letter addressed by the People's Militia to the Soviet people, and especially the frantic attacks against the 99 Praga factory workers, who in their letter expressed their faithfulness to socialism and friendship with the Soviet Union, were salient evidence of the emerging white terror. Anti-Sovietism and its attendant misuse of national feelings were the unifying platform of the right wing and the counter-revolution.

The fight for power became also a fight for a change in the foreign-political orientation of the CSSR. The rightist opportunist and anti-socialist bloc made efforts to liquidate the basic guarantees of the national and state existence of socialist Czechoslovakia, which lie in the alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This should have created external conditions for the liquidation of socialism in Czechoslovakia.

These and many other facts document the connection between the events in Czechoslovakia and the fight of international imperialism against the socialist community. The strategists in the centers of world anti-communism had their direct assistants in socialist Czechoslovakia. One of them, I. Svitak, became the spokesman of extreme reactionary forces which were aligning themselves in such organizations as K231 and the Club of Committed Non-Party Members (KAN). Their program was the liquidation of the achievements of February 1948 and the virtual liquidation of socialism. The center of K231 was headed by K. Nigrin, J. Brodsky, V. Palecek, O. Rambousek and others who were mostly direct agents of western intelligence services. The founders of KAN were in addition to I. Svitak the writer V. Havel and Professor V. Cerny, who had close contacts with the post-February emigration. KAN and

K231 were tightly linked with western intelligence services and were given not only political but also material support.

A considerable influence in the fight against socialism in the CSSR was exerted by forces which committed themselves from the positions of Zionism, one of the tools of international imperialism and anti-communism. Their leading representatives in the country were F. Kriegel, J. Pelikan, A. Lustig, E. Goldstucker, A. J. Liehm, E. Lobl, K. Winter and many others.

An important role in anti-communist plans based on what was demagogically called democratic socialism was held by the re-emerging Social Democratic Party. This Party was preparing to appear as an independent political force, playing upon the social-democratic survivals in the thinking of a part of members of the CPCz whom it wanted to bring over to its side. It was calculated that the Social Democratic Party, "unburdened with the period of the construction of socialism," would be attractive for the disoriented and politically unfirm part of society. With the agreement and the support of rightist functionaries of the CPZz, F. Kriegel, J. Smrkovsky, Z. Mlynar, J. Litera, L. Lis and others, an illegal preparatory central committee was created, whose members were, inter alia, Z. Bechyne, J. Munzar, O. Janyr, F. Supka. At the same time, preparatory committees constituted themselves in the regions and districts and at some places there were also set up basic organizations. These activities, which were developed in close cooperation with leaders of the Socialist International, had the task of achieving a political split among the working class. Programs of further activities aimed at negating the leading role of the CPCz and at restoring the old bourgeois-democratic and clerical basis were worked out also in the other parties associated in the National Front, in the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the Czechoslovak People's Party, the Slovak Revival Party and the Freedom Party.

An important role in the anti-socialist game involving the fate of Czechoslovakia fell to the reactionary representatives of the Catholic clergy who were amply supported by the Catholic emigration living abroad.

The combined actions of foreign and internal reactionary forces were deepening the inner-political crisis which was ever more reflected in the relations with our closest allies.

The fraternal parties, especially the CPSU, endeavored with great patience to eliminate the tension in mutual relations and to convince the leadership of our Party that it is necessary to resist the counter-revolutionary threat in the CSSR. To this end they made use of all possibilities provided by official and personal contacts. At the meetings in Dresden, Sofia and Moscow, in the first half of 1968, their representatives showed A. Dubcek on the basis of

concrete facts that the situation in the CSSR was developing in a dangerous direction which, at the same time, endangered the common interests of the socialist camp. A. Dubcek's assurances that the leadership of the CPCz was also aware of the gravity of the situation and that it itself felt the need to redress the situation were, however, at home suppressed, evaded and not fulfilled. The minutes of the talks with Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, Comrade J. Kadar and other comrades, as well as a whole series of letters which the General Secretary of the CPSU and the First Secretaries of other fraternal parties sent to A. Dubcek and to the leadership of our Party, just as the telephone talks, show quite clearly how sincerely and deeply the parties and the people of the fraternal socialist countries were agitated by the difficulties in our inner-political life and the danger which was developing into a threat to the existence of socialism in Czechoslovakia. They offered comradely support and assistance for coping with the situation and exhausted all political means which came into consideration in order to rouse A. Dubcek and his followers to adopting a responsible communist course.

The leading representatives of the rightist opportunist forces were actually officially proclaiming a policy of friendship with the socialist countries, but they hypocritically covered up and in fact supported efforts to drown and blunt the traditional and deep friendship of our nations for the people of the Soviet Union. In an effort to block any attempt to reach understanding and to restore mutual confidence between the CPCz and the fraternal parties of the socialist countries, the rightist forces pushed through the non-participation of the delegation of the CPCz in the Warsaw meeting of the fraternal parties in July 1968, and in this way set out on a course towards a rupture with the allies.

In spite of the resistance of some of its members, the presidium of the CC CPCz recklessly rejected the Warsaw letter and chose a course directed against the very interest of our Party and socialism. The reply of the Presidium concealed the gravity of the rightist and counter-revolutionary danger, to which our allies had comradely drawn attention in their letter. At variance with the resolution of the May plenum, the reply of the Presidium even declared that the main danger for our society was "conservatism."

In an extremely tense situation in the Party and in society, the July plenum of the CC CPCz was convened, which, however, no longer found sufficient strength and courage to oppose the incorrect course of the Presidium of the CC CPCz and even confirmed its standpoint. This contributed considerably towards deepening the disorientation among communists and in our entire society. The fundamentally incorrect resolution of the July 1968 plenum was annulled only by the plenum of the CC CPCz in September 1969.

The fraternal parties were patiently striving for talks with representatives of the CPCz, in order to achieve a solution of the complicated problems in mutual relations which emerged as a result of the growth of the counter-revolutionary situation in Czechoslovakia and of the threat to the interests of socialism. At the talks in Cierna nad Tisou, the political bureau of the CC CPSU appealed to the leadership of our Party that it should realize its communist and internationalist responsibilities and solve the dangerous situation in Czechoslovakia with its own forces.

The attitudes of individual members of the Presidium of the CC CPCz were fundamentally different. The rightist representatives did not go to the talks in Cierna with honest intentions. Between themselves, they made no secret of the intention to once more deceive our most faithful allies in order to gain time up to the 14th Congress of the CPCz which was to bring them definitive victory. They hypocritically pretended that they were determined to take urgently necessary measures against the anti-socialist forces and counter-revolutionary organizations. They also played the same role in Bratislava, at the meeting of representatives of the six socialist countries.

After the talks in Cierna n. T. and in Bratislava A. Dubcek and his followers in the leadership of the CPCz adopted the tactics of procrastination and delaying the realization of the measures they had promised to take at the talks with the allies. Moreover, they distorted the results of the talks and presented them as their victory. A. Dubcek not only ignored but even kept secret from the leadership of the CPCz the justified apprehensions of the fraternal parties for the fate of socialism in Czechoslovakia and of peace in Europe. Together with other rightist representatives in the Party leadership, he prevented the convening of a plenary session of the CC CPCz which was urgently necessary in this difficult and complicated period. He hypocritically betrayed the principle which he had solemnly co-signed in Bratislava, that the "support, protection and strengthening of the socialist achievements which the nations have achieved by their heroic efforts, by the selfless work of the people of each country, are the joint internationalist duty of all socialist countries."

III

The designs and aims of the counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia were the same as in Hungary in 1956, merely the tactics were different in view of the different conditions and time. The anti-socialist forces in our country, which acted in harmony with the designs of contemporary imperialism, oriented themselves primarily upon

using methods of political, ideological and power destruction and on the gradual implementation of the counter-revolutionary aims within a longer period of time than was the case in Hungary. However, in our country, too, these forces anticipated that at an appropriate time, in case their plans should meet with resistance, they would unleash even physical terror against Marxist-Leninist cadres and against citizens devoted to the cause of socialism.

Today, it is already, on the basis of gained knowledge, possible to answer the question of how the threat to the revolutionary achievements of our people was growing and why the counter-revolutionary course of events was not halted and the cause of socialism in the CSSR defended by internal forces, either by way of political struggle or with the help of our own means of power.

The process of developing the socialist revolution has, under conditions of the existence of the world system of socialism, its objective laws and binding criteria which, with due respect to national specificities, determined the character of socialist power and are the condition of steady revolutionary development of social progress. Violation of these laws seriously harms the interests of socialism and if they are altogether negated and rejected such a course becomes essentially anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary. The permanent and unalterable values of socialism include:

- the leading position of the working class and its vanguard — the Communist Party;

- the role of the socialist state as the instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat;

- Marxist-Leninist ideology and its application through all media influencing the masses;

- socialist social ownership of the means of production and principles of planned management of the national economy;

- the principles of proletarian internationalism and their consistent implementation in foreign policy, especially in relation to the Soviet Union.

Developments after January 1968 confirm that the right wing was leading a purposive attack against all basic values and norms of socialism and that it was systematically disrupting the Party and the entire socialist political system. This broadly based onslaught was facilitated by the fact that A. Dubcek, who initially enjoyed confidence in the Party and in the country, was gradually retreating from Marxist-Leninist positions and was getting in the tow of rightist opportunist and anti-socialist forces, until he eventually became their symbol.

1. *The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia gradually ceased to be in 1968 the managing center of the socialist social system. Under the deposit of revisionism it was losing the character of a*

Marxist-Leninist party, which made it impossible for it to assert the leading role in society. In consequence of the negation of the principles of democratic centralism, the Party was gradually deprived of its capacity to act. The CC CPCz was as a whole eliminated from taking decisions on cardinal questions which according to the Party Rules are within its exclusive competence.

The conduct of the rightist and the wavering part of the Presidium and of the Secretariat of the CC CPCz contributed to the fact that the absolute majority of regional and district Party Committees and Party organizations of many large enterprises eventually came under the control of aggressive rightist groups. The rightist representatives of the Presidium and of the Secretariat of the CC CPCz became spokesmen of the bloc of revisionist and nationalist forces, paralyzed the political activity of the working class and its resistance against the growing counter-revolutionary plot in the country. They were clearing the field for the disruptive activities of the rightist and antisocialist forces and in this way contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of pressure and fear.

The rightist part of the leadership of the CPCz not only tolerated but even instigated general attacks against the Party apparatus, paralyzed its activities and the work of elected bodies. The Party apparatus was at the same time being replaced by various commissions and actives which in reality were pressure groups of the rightist elements. Decisions on the composition of these commissions and on the actives were not taken in Party bodies. In the Party apparatus and elsewhere, various opportunists and career-seekers were elbowing their way to the forefront, who, in an effort to win favor of the rightists, slandered and vilified the activities of the Party and its glorious revolutionary history.

The Central Committee of the CPCz, as the supreme Party body between congresses, as well as its executive bodies, ceased to fulfil the role of headquarters directing the development of socialist society and the defense of its revolutionary achievements. A. Dubcek and his followers, who monopolized decision-making in the Party leadership, paralyzed the activities of the Presidium and the entire CC CPCz. They prevented the adoption of effective measures at a time when this was still possible and by their attitude cleared one position after another to hostile and reactionary forces. This heightened and intensified the audacity and aggressiveness of the counter-revolution, while the possibility of it being suppressed by internal political and power means gradually weakened to the point when it practically disappeared.

2. The disintegration of socialist power also attained a considerable degree. The conduct of A. Dubcek at the head of the Party and of O. Cernik as Prime Minister greatly contributed to the fact that

the activities of the power organs of the socialist state, the security body, the judiciary and the army were gradually disrupted, of which full advantage was taken by internal and foreign enemies of our system.

The activities of the government and its course were, in addition to O. Cernik, determined by other rightist officials who were weakening the state leadership of socialist society, deforming the aims of the economic reform and opening up scope in all possible ways for revisionist and anti-socialist conceptions in all fundamental spheres of state policy. They included primarily O. Sik who gradually got from his revisionist conceptions in the economic sphere to direct betrayal of socialism and eventually ended up as a common-place lackey of anti-communist centers in the West.

O. Cernik as Prime Minister ignored many critical voices and recommendations of comrades from the government and of elected functionaries of national committees. He essentially paralyzed the initiative aimed at the elimination of negative phenomena. He did not give members of the government, and especially of its Presidium, objective information about the real situation in the country, nor about the serious problems which were arising in our relations with the USSR and other allies, although these questions were constantly on the agenda of the Presidium of the CC CPCz. In this way, those Deputy Premiers and Ministers who were concerned about the contemporary situation and demanded resolute measures against the growing danger were becoming isolated.

The gradual paralyzation of the actual mission and the activities of the power organs was carried out by the right wing after thorough premeditation, overtly as well as in disguised form. It wanted to achieve a situation in which these bodies would, in case of need, be unable to take a resolute stand against the counter-revolution and to defend the power of the working class but, on the contrary, that they could even be abused, at the right moment, by the rightist circles striving for a reversal of political conditions. At the same time, the right wing put forward the question of recompensing all revolutionary acts of class injustice from the period after February 1948, and in this connection insolently abused the fact that the Party had admitted and criticized cases of violation of socialist legality in the fifties.

Gradually, a situation was created that honest workers of power organs of the state were being politically disarmed and isolated, whereas the provocativeness and audacity of counter-revolutionaries and of downright criminal elements did not meet with resistance and sanctions on the part of the state power. Honest members of the security body were disoriented by the very fact that the Minister of the Interior, J. Pavel, did not make any secret of his intention to liquidate the State Security body. He publicly pro-

claimed this and also implemented it in practice. Neither did he conceal that he identified himself with the program of the revisionist and anti-socialist forces.

The leadership of the Party and of the state not only failed to call the Minister of the Interior, J. Pavel, to account on Party and service lines, but, by its complete inactivity, aided the boundless liberalization in the security and judicial bodies which in its consequences inevitably led to the loss of political and legal security of citizens of the Czechoslovak socialist state.

Overall developments in the Party and in the entire society had logically also a negative impact on the activities and the political and moral state of the Czechoslovak army. The new leadership of the army started to be formed in April 1968, in an atmosphere of uncertainty and growing rightist pressures, when the political disintegration in the army was accompanied by a general loosening of discipline and violation of the principles of the indivisible power of commanders, to an extent unthinkable in a socialist country.

One of the political and ideological centers of the right wing was the Military Political Academy from which, in the summer of 1968, there even originated an official memorandum demanding a reassessment of the principles of the Party's and the state's military policy which had been approved by the 13th Congress of the CPCz, and an adjustment of the Czechoslovak military doctrine on the basis of a revision of our relationship with the Warsaw Treaty.

A considerable share in the growth of negative phenomena in the army was held by General V. Prchlik who after January 1968 shifted from the function of chief of the Main Political Administration to the post of head of department of the CC CPCz for the Direction of Party Work in the army, the security body, courts and the prosecution. V. Prchlik became an active executant of the opportunist course in relation to the army, the security body, the courts and the prosecution.

The state existing at that time in the army and in the security body required resolute measures in order to strengthen Party influence. However, what happened was the very opposite. The security and defense department of the CC CPCz was, instead of a cadre solution, at A. Dubcek's proposal abolished. The supreme Party body thus lost an important instrument for directing communists in the army and in the security body.

These and many other facts prove that the political and combat preparedness of the Czechoslovak army was considerably impaired. The great extent to which our army was hit by rightist opportunism is confirmed by the fact that a considerable number of members of army unit organizations was expelled from the Party because of anti-socialist activities and gross violation of military regulations, and many of them had to leave the army.

In the supreme legislative body—the National Assembly—all decisive positions were also seized by a group of rightist deputies headed by the National Assembly's Chairman Josef Smrkovsky. J. Smrkovsky was surrounded by an artificially created cult of a "people's tribune" who was to have a decisive say in everything. J. Smrkovsky and his helpers in Parliament as well as in the mass media suppressed, by studied demagoguery, every voice of alarm raised by those deputies who respected the real interests of the Party and the people and were demanding a resolute course against the hostile forces. J. Smrkovsky was on the one hand pushing through the adoption of certain incorrect legislative amendments playing into the hands of the right wing, while on the other hand he was in every possible way, together with F. Kriegel, delaying the adoption of legislative measures directed against reaction and counter-revolution.

The machinations of the rightist forces in the sphere of state power are also proved by the election of deputies to the Czech National Council in July 1968. The election of deputies was even accompanied by electoral frauds. The Czech National Council, headed by C. Cisar, was being turned by the right wing into another important instrument for the achievement of a political reversal in the country.

The decisive links of executive and legislative power in Czechoslovakia thus gradually ceased to fulfil their class mission in the political system of the socialist state. The rightist opportunist and anti-socialist forces gained key positions in them and made use of their positions for nipping in the bud every effort intended to halt and avert the catastrophic development.

The power organs of the state security body, the judiciary and the army were paralyzed, they were not directed by leading bodies of the Party and state, so that they were unable to oppose the intense onslaught of the counter-revolutionary underground and the subversive activities of external enemies. The fighting capacity and the moral and political state of the Czechoslovak People's Army markedly declined, so that there legitimately arose the question whether our army was able, without clear instructions of the leadership of the Party and the government, to ensure the protection of our western border which is at the same time the border of the whole world socialist system.

3. In the political system of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, an important place in the construction and defense of socialism is held by the National Front as the political alliance of working people of towns and villages, social organizations and special-interest associations which recognize the leading role of the CPCz. The rightist opportunist forces concentrated after January 1968 on transforming the National Front into such a political grouping which would negate the leading role of the CPCz in our society. The main instigator

of these endeavors was the Chairman of the Central Committee of the National Front and member of the Presidium of the CC CPCz, Fr. Kriegel, who became one of the leading figures of the nationalist, anti-Soviet and downright counter-revolutionary current.

A particularly vehement struggle was waged for the trade unions which the right wing wanted to deprive of their class content and mission. Efforts to disrupt the unity of the trade union movement were the expression of the concentrated attack on the part of the right wing against the class unity of the working people; this attack was at the same time intended to undermine and liquidate the leading position of the working class in socialist society. The working class as a whole did not allow itself to be pushed by the counter-revolution to anti-Soviet acts.

Principled trade union officials, especially honest communists, were scandalized and removed from functions without being given protection by Party bodies. Instead of them, the right wing pushed into functions advocates of the so-called process of revival and not infrequently even déclassé elements; the main criterion in their selection was their negative attitude to the leading role of the Party, to the Marxist-Leninist conception of socialist construction and to the alliance with the Soviet Union.

Under the slogan of a "new trade union policy" a "Draft Program of Activities of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement" was elaborated and widely publicized, which had a downright opportunist and revisionist character. It negated the Leninist principles of the organizing and educational activities of trade unions under socialism and their share of responsibility for the development of the socialist economy. In the elections of trade union bodies, the thesis on "trade unions without communists" was successful in a considerable number of enterprises. There were even cases when various so-called organizations of working people were set up outside the framework of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, such as, e.g., the Federation of Locomotive Crews, which were controlled by downright counter-revolutionary elements.

A similar process as in the trade unions was also taking place, with partial specifications, in other social organizations associated in the National Front. Great damage was perpetrated by the right wing, especially in relation to our youth. Under the guise of criticism of shortcomings, the Czechoslovak Union of Youth was broken up as a unified organization influencing the political and ideological education of young people in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. As a result of the irresolute course taken by the Presidium of the CC CPCz, youth organizations were delivered to the tender mercies of rightist and counter-revolutionary forces.

At that time, political life was also entered by new organizations with an openly anti-socialist program, such as K231 and KAN, which

were directly linked to western anti-communist centers. This was only further evidence that the destructive process in our political system had already acquired definite counter-revolutionary features. These two reactionary organizations quite openly proclaimed that their immediate aim was a revenge for February 1948 and they did not even hide the fact that they wanted to establish a bourgeois democratic system and settle ruthlessly accounts with communists and all honest builders of socialism. The leadership of the Party and of the government did not take action even against such clearly anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary groupings.

In the Czechoslovak Socialist Party and in the Czechoslovak People's Party, ever greater influence was being gained by forces which wanted to return to them the old anti-communist role these two parties had been playing before February 1948. These aims were served by the mass recruitment of new members and the adoption of new programs. Broad activities were also developed by the Work of Council Revival, which was gaining a considerably large mass basis, especially in Slovakia, in the service of militant political clericalism.

A program of an open revision of February 1948 and of splitting up again the political unity of the working class was also put forward by the Social Democratic Party which voiced its support of the anti-communist line of the Socialist International.

Many facts prove that, in 1968, a broad anti-communist coalition was created in this country and that there was emerging a new structure of the political system which was actually restoring the situation that existed before February 1948 and in which there even appeared distinct features of the pre-Munich bourgeois republic. While the CPCz was being disrupted by rightist opportunists and while its activities were paralyzed and its capacity to act was crippled, the petty bourgeois counter-revolution was creating for itself ever greater reserves which it detailed to the political struggle as required. The rightist part of the leadership of the CPCz presented this anti-socialist movement as the positive political committedness of our citizens. At the same time, the right wing described all those who came out against these dangerous phenomena as sectarian and conservative opponents of "socialist revival." In reality, the rightist opportunist officials opened up scope for downright reactionary and counter-revolutionary elements which were elbowing their way to the forefront and did not conceal their intention to remove A. Dubcek, O. Cernik and others from power as soon as they no longer needed their protection and patronage.

4. In pushing through their aims, the right wing and anti-socialist forces placed also extraordinary emphasis on eliminating the leading role of the Party in the economy, on disrupting the principles of central planned management of the national economy and on push-

ing through a revisionist conception of the economic reform. The Czechoslovak economy was to be gradually separated from the socialist community and tied, as much as possible, to the economy of the capitalist West.

The rightist opportunist practice and interpretation of the economic reform pursued the abolition of all central economic bodies of management, the complete negation of the role of the plan, separation of economic management from political decision-making and the gradual liquidation of all-people's ownership. The essential aim was to completely eliminate the socialist state, the Party and the trade unions from the shaping and implementation of the economic policy and to unleash uncontrolled market conditions with all their negative consequences for the social and material position of the working people. Under the pretext that it was necessary to comply with the wishes of consumers, the right wing advocated private enterprise in order that the petty bourgeois element might also have its own economic basis for disrupting socialism. The counter-revolutionary designs in the sphere of the national economy are today already openly admitted by O. Sik himself and his friends in the West.

In theory as well as in practice, the transformation of the socialist economy was thus gradually prepared and stagewise implemented into a system which would deprive the working class and all working people not only of all revolutionary achievements but also of basic political and economic security. The right wing anticipated that the gradual deterioration of the economic situation would evoke spontaneous discontent among the Czechoslovak working people, and that it would then take advantage of this discontent in the fight against socialist power.

5. Serious problems and crisis phenomena in the ideological sphere, which had originated and developed in our society over a considerable time, resulted after January 1968 in the distortion, negation and eventually even in direct rejection of the basic principles of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook in philosophy, sociology, history, in the economy, in the sphere of the state, law and Party structure, as well as in culture and the arts; in all these fields there was direct capitulation to bourgeois ideology. The ideological struggle developed into a direct struggle for power in which the right wing made full use of the mass media.

Because of the capitulationist attitude of the rightist part of the Dubcek leadership, the rightist forces secured full control of the radio, television, news reels and the majority of the press, and transformed them into the main pressure and power instrument for pushing through their aims. The overall orientation of the content of the mass media essentially merged with the ideological subversive activity of the West.

The aggressive groups of the so-called progressives were silencing and terrorizing honest editors and journalists who wanted to evaluate the situation in our country truthfully and objectively. They intimidated by all possible means everyone who was defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, the alliance with the USSR and our membership in the world socialist community, who expressed disagreement with or resisted the rising wave of anti-socialist and anti-Soviet hysteria, and were demanding his elimination from the national community.

The Czechoslovak events confirm that in the ideological sphere there can be no question of retreating before bourgeois ideology with which there can be no compromise. They confirm that the Party must not succumb to practicicism, weaken ideological work, reduce it to mere propaganda of policy, to abstract explanation of Marxist-Leninist teachings. Ideological work of the Party has always been, continues to be and must remain an inseparable part of the political fight of the Party and the working class. Every neglect, every weakening of mass-political and ideological work of the Party, every disruption of its theoretical, class and internationalist foundations are exploited by the ideological opponent. This logically leads at first to attempts to "improve" or "perfect" socialism, to the replacement of internationalism by nationalism, develops into cultivation of the ideal of petty-bourgeois consumer socialism, to the creation of false myths about socialist reality, until it eventually results in rejection and negation of socialism in general. The Communist Party and the socialist state must control all instruments for putting through their political, class and ideological aims. The mass media, the press, radio, television and cinema, are an immensely important instrument of power and mass political education which must never get out of the direction and control of the Marxist-Leninist party and the socialist state, if the cause of socialism is not to be seriously endangered.

6. Throughout the existence of the Czechoslovak Republic, the working class and the working people, headed by the CPCz, were waging a struggle for the basic foreign political orientation of the state, which would safeguard its independence, sovereignty and free development. The Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Post-War Co-operation of December 12, 1943, was the expression of the will of the people who found out for themselves, on the basis of the tragic experience from the years 1938 and 1939 and in the course of the national liberation struggle, that the vital interests of our nations, the internal and international security of the Czechoslovak state are inseparable from the indestructible internationalist fraternity with the Soviet Union. This unswerving will of the people was anchored in the Kosice Government Program and was definitively reaffirmed by the victorious February of 1948. The

Constitution of the CSSR, all resolutions adopted at congresses of the CPCz, the Party Rules and program statements of Czechoslovak governments after February 1948, state clearly and unequivocally that our friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union, with which we are linked by common class interests, is the chief safeguard of the very existence of the Czech and Slovak nations and the supreme guarantee of our successful socialist road.

However, after January 1968 the right wing started to throw this basic truth increasingly into doubt, until it finally openly adopted anti-Soviet positions and deliberately undermined our internationalist commitments ensuing from the membership of the CSSR in the Warsaw Treaty. Under the slogan of a so-called "own face" of Czechoslovak foreign policy, a course aiming at a rupture with our socialist allies and fraternal parties was being pushed through step by step. Such a detrimental line was implemented at a time when our country had become the object of the main interest of imperialism which wanted to exploit our inner-political development for dealing a blow to the cause of socialism not only in our country but, through Czechoslovakia, also to the vital interests of the entire socialist community. The anti-Soviet orientation of the rightist forces in the CPCz became also part of the international revisionist current for which the so-called Czechoslovak experiment was an invigorating injection and a new argument in support of the demand for a revision of the main principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism in the communist movement.

The foreign political conception of the right wing, which was the result of the counter-revolutionary development in the CSSR, led in its consequences not only to a threat to the internal stability and security of the state and to its sovereignty and peaceful conditions for calm work of the people, but also to the exposure of the Western border of the camp of socialism, of which Czechoslovakia was to be a firm outpost at the dividing line between the socialist and the capitalist system in Europe. The defense and preservation of socialism in our country did not, therefore, concern only the immediate interests of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and our working people, but they necessarily became the common concern of the socialist states, the fraternal parties of these countries and the entire communist movement.

This general characteristic of the crisis development within the Party and society in the CSSR confirms that the disruptive process unleashed by the rightist and anti-socialist forces affected all spheres of public and political life—the economy, ideology and foreign policy. In August 1968, an acute counter-revolutionary situation emerged in Czechoslovakia and our country found itself on the verge of civil war. In all sharpness, there arose the question of "who will come out on top?". Either the counter-revolution, relying

on the support of international reaction, would complete its pernicious work, or else the socialist forces would succeed in repelling the counter-revolution and in defending the cause of socialism.

Communists as well as non-communists, who were aware of the mortal danger threatening our socialist system, were demanding that the leadership of the Party and the state resolutely resist the counter-revolutionary forces and stand up in defense of the achievements of socialism. These urgent appeals were contained in many resolutions and letters to the CC CPCz, but they remained without answer. At the time when the counter-revolutionary forces in Prague and at other places were going over into open attack in an effort to seize power, the rightist representatives in the leadership of the Party assured the public that "everything is in order" and that "the process of revival and democratization is successfully developing."

Thousands of communists, individual citizens and entire collectives of working people, representatives of all strata of the population and various organizations, including members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, as well as members of the Government of the CSSR and deputies of the National Assembly and of the Slovak National Council, being aware of their class, national and international responsibility for the fate of socialism in Czechoslovakia, were persistently seeking a way out of the difficult, critical situation. In view of the fact that the rightist part of the Party leadership did not want to adopt any measures which would have led to thwarting the counter-revolutionary coup and to averting civil war, they began to turn to the leadership of the fraternal parties and to the governments of our allies with the request that at this historically serious moment they should grant internationalist assistance to the Czechoslovak people in the defense of socialism. They did so in the deep conviction that their class brethren would not leave Czechoslovakia at the mercy of counter-revolution which threatened with bloodshed, and that they would prevent our country from being torn out of the socialist community.

Objective assessment and clarification of the causes and interrelations of the deep crisis in which the CPCz and our entire society found themselves in 1968 give irrefutable proof that the internal forces, paralyzed by the policy of the rightist representatives in the Party leadership, were unable to mobilize themselves and to halt the frontal onslaught of the counter-revolution. In this situation, it was necessary to decide whether to wait up until the counter-revolution provoked a fratricidal fight in which thousands of people would die and to grant internationalist assistance only afterwards, or whether to come in time and prevent a bloody tragedy even at the cost of an initial lack of understanding at home and abroad. The entry of the allied troops into Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968

prevented such bloodshed and was therefore the requisite and only correct solution.

Thorough examination of facts on the conditions in our Party and in the whole country before August 1968, as well as in the subsequent period, confirms that any other solution which would not comprise immediate external assistance by the USSR and our other allies, could not, under conditions when the activities of the Party were paralyzed and the Czechoslovak state system was on the verge of disintegration, have any chance of success since it would not have led to saving socialism in the CSSR.

The entry of the allied troops of the five socialist countries into Czechoslovakia was an act of internationalist solidarity which corresponded both to the common interests of the Czechoslovak working people and of the international working class, the socialist community and the class interests of the world communist movement. This internationalist action saved the lives of thousands of people, ensuring internal and external conditions for their peaceful and calm work, strengthened the western border of the socialist camp and thwarted the hopes of imperialist circles for a revision of the results of the Second World War.

The CC CPCz rejects the abstract concept of the sovereignty of a socialist state, which is being disseminated by bourgeois propaganda in the interest of deceiving the masses, and stands on positions which correspond also in the question of sovereignty to the class and internationalist character of the socialist state. It therefore regards the entry of the allied troops into the CSSR as fraternal internationalist assistance to the Czechoslovak people.

The internationalist action of August to save socialism in the CSSR created a firm hinterland for Czechoslovak communists who, thanks to this assistance, could fully develop their own political struggle against the counter-revolutionary, anti-socialist and rightist opportunist forces and could by political means overcome the counter-revolutionary threat to the cause of socialism in the CSSR.

Truthful knowledge of the whole background of the real situation in 1968 and of all motives for the entry of the allied troops into the CSSR shows in a true light all the lies, slanders and deliberate distortions of facts fabricated and disseminated by our internal reaction, rightist opportunists and foreign bourgeois propaganda about the events of August. Deep and correct understanding of the real significance of these events is at the same time the decisive prerequisite for the creation of a sound political atmosphere in our country, for strengthening the ideological and action unity of the CPCz on a Marxist-Leninist and internationalist basis.

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After the entry of the allied troops, A. Dubcek, O. Cernik, J. Smr-

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kovsky, Fr. Kriegel, J. Spacek, Z. Mlynar, S. Sadovsky, C. Cisar, V. Slavik deepened their betrayal of the interests of the Party, the Czechoslovak people and the international communist movement, and took another hazardous step. In the night from August 20 to 21, 1968, they pushed through, in spite of principled opposition and disagreement of the Marxist-Leninist part in the Party leadership, a non-class, anti-internationalist declaration of the Presidium of the CC CPCz, whose publication had catastrophic consequences.

After this perfidious act, A. Dubcek dissolved the session of the Presidium of the CC CPCz. With his knowledge and behind the back of the CC CPCz, the Presidium and part of the City Committee of the CPCz in Prague, which represented a well-known bulwark of the right wing, convened the illegal extraordinary congress of the CPCz at which the rightist opportunists wanted to seize full control of the Party leadership and, in particular, to proclaim an all-round struggle against the Soviet Union and to mobilize against it not only all domestic but also foreign anti-Soviet and anti-communist forces.

After August 21, 1968, the anti-socialist forces turned the declaration of the Presidium of the CC CPCz, which was in its essence an unprecedented anti-Party act, into their shield. The right wing blackmailed thousands of members and functionaries of the Party and forced them to be guided by this declaration. It recalled that communists must fulfil with discipline the resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of their Party. With its assistance, it opened up fully the flood-gate of anti-Soviet hysteria and put into motion an avalanche of chauvinism which was outwardly expressed by pseudo-patriotic appeals and slogans. There ensued incredible disorientation because the counter-revolution deliberately provoked, with the assistance of the mass media, a wild panic. It turned all basic notions and values upside down. What was legal was declared to be illegal, while all illegal activities of the counter-revolution were given the semblance of legality.

On the basis of the declaration of the Presidium of the CC CPCz, the right wing forced the adoption of similar declarations in the government, the National Assembly and other state and social organizations. The rightist opportunists and counter-revolutionary forces exacted agreement with their nationalist and anti-Soviet content by moral terror and even by threats of physical violence.

The counter-revolutionary role of the mass media climaxed after August 21, 1968 in a tornado of chauvinistic demagogy which was to prevent Czechoslovak citizens from discerning the correct dividing line of the class struggle. This demagogy was at the same time intended to create in our country and in the state the impression that this was a "patriotic movement of the whole nation." To this atmosphere succumbed even many honest communists and decent citizens of our republic who, because of the general mis-

information and the deeply erroneous declaration of the Presidium of the CC CPCz, were unable to quickly discern the real truth. Many of them committed acts which were at variance with their real conviction. Gradually, they found out for themselves and are finding out that the internationalist assistance of the allies was correct, they sincerely regret their attitudes and actions of that period and express by honest work their devotion to the cause of socialism.

In the complicated situation of that time, statesmanlike prudence and foresight were displayed by Comrade L. Svoboda. Already in the night from August 20 to 21, 1968, and in subsequent days, the President of the Republic and the Minister of Defense issued orders in which they enjoined the Czechoslovak People's Army to keep calm and not to provoke clashes with the troops of the allies. These orders were essentially fulfilled, which prevented unforeseeable consequences.

After August 21, 1968, the counter-revolutionary elements created chaos, disruption, constant tension and disturbances in Czechoslovakia. The rightist opportunists, too, engaged in intensive activity in order to prevent, at all costs, normalization in the Party and in relations with the fraternal parties. People like V. Silhan, J. Litera, I. Sabata, L. Lis, Z. Hejzlar, J. Pelikan, B. Rattinger, M. Vaculik, P. Machonin, K. Kaplan, M. Hajek, R. Horak, D. Havlicek, J. Ruml and others who had earlier, together with the exponents of the right wing in the leadership of the Party and the state, carried out dangerous activities and helped to create the counter-revolutionary situation and disrupted the Party, state organs and social organizations, were now making every possible effort in order to constantly maintain the extreme tension in the country. The absolute majority of them were among the main organizers of the illegal Vysocany Congress held on August 22, 1968. Most delegates to this Congress, among whom participants were missing from Slovakia, created the background for the pre-arranged proclamation of a platform which was at complete variance with the mission, the program and the whole revolutionary and internationalist history of our Party. The illegal Vysocany Congress set itself the aim:

- to adopt a comprehensive anti-Soviet platform which contained various ultimative demands in relation to the CPSU and the Soviet Union. In this, the rightists assumed the pose of some sort of victors, although, in reality, they already were mere bankrupts;

- to openly proclaim the rupture with the CPSU and other fraternal parties. The organizers of the illegal Congress even arrogantly assumed the right to excommunicate these parties from the international communist movement;

- to negate all revolutionary traditions of the Party and its

Marxist-Leninist program principles, and to transform it into some sort of a nationalist, chauvinist and anti-Soviet grouping under the name of the CPCz.

The attempt of the right wing to complete the coup in the CPCz was also reflected in the staged elections of the so-called Vysocany Central Committee, which included predominantly people standing on anti-Party positions. The right wing also seized the central press organ of the Party, *Rude Pravo*, whose individual numbers, especially from August 21 to September 3, by their entire provocative nationalist and anti-Soviet content betrayed the internationalist traditions of *Rude Pravo* and did not have anything in common either with the Party or with Marxism-Leninism.

The Vysocany rightist center misinformed and deceived by all possible means the fraternal parties, especially in the West, in an effort to secure also within the framework of the international communist movement support for its revisionist and anti-Soviet course. At the same time, it actively helped to turn the so-called Czechoslovak question into the cardinal point of a spiteful campaign unleashed by imperialist circles. O. Sik, who on August 21, 1968, together with a group of Ministers—exponents of the right wing—was in Belgrade, illegally commissioned J. Hajek to go to the United Nations. J. Hajek actually participated in the discussion of the so-called Czechoslovak question in the Security Council upon whose agenda it was forced by the western powers. At this forum, he delivered a very crafty anti-Soviet speech, although he was conveyed strict instructions from the President of the Republic, the Government and the CC CPCz that he should not go to New York and that he should not take the floor in the Security Council.

On August 23, 1968, the President of the Republic, Comrade L. Svoboda and a Czechoslovak delegation consisting of comrades G. Husak, V. Bilak, A. Indra, J. Piller, M. Dzur and B. Kucera left for Moscow in spite of opposition on the part of the rightist representatives. In Moscow it was joined by A. Dubcek, O. Cernik, J. Smrkovsky, J. Spacek and B. Simon and, on August 25, by further members of the Party leadership, O. Svestka, E. Rigo, F. Barbirek, M. Jakes, J. Lenart and Z. Mlynar.

The results of the four-day talks between the Czechoslovak and Soviet leading representatives were expressed in a joint protocol signed by all participants present. The Czechoslovak representatives expressed in this document their determination to achieve a normalization of conditions in our country on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, to restore the leading role of the Party and the authority of the state power of the working class, to eliminate counter-revolutionary organizations from political life and to strengthen the international ties of the CSSR with the Soviet Union and

other socialist countries. This document was a starting-point for constructive work. An active part in the general positive results of the Moscow talks was played on the Czechoslovak side by comrades L. Svoboda, G. Husak, V. Bilak and other comrades holding clear internationalist class positions.

At this time, a rapid course of events set in also in Slovakia where—although there were certain differences—it contained similar features as in the Czech lands. On August 21, 22 and 23, the sound part of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia endeavored, with the participation of Comrade Husak, to maintain necessary prudence and responsibility. After the arrival of commissioners of the so-called Vysocany Central Committee (F. Vodslon, L. Hrdinova, and S. Sadovsky), the rightist opportunist representatives of the Communist Party of Slovakia V. Pavlenda, J. Zrak, A. Tazky, S. Faltan, R. Harencar, convened through the rightist part of the City Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia in Bratislava an extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia for August 26, 1968. This Congress initially proceeded in an extremely nationalist and anti-Soviet atmosphere. It espoused the results of the illegal Vysocany Congress and, following its example, adopted a provocative appeal addressed to the communist and workers' parties of the five socialist countries.

After a break in its proceedings, the extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia reconvened on August 28. It was attended, after his return from Moscow, by Comrade G. Husak whose speech brought about a fundamental change in its course. The extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia adopted a resolution by which it rejected the legality of the so-called Vysocany Congress, annulled the content of the conclusions of the first part of the Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia, unanimously approved the Moscow Protocol and elected G. Husak First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia. The influence and pressure of the rightist opportunist forces was, of course, still considerable, which was reflected in particular in the elections to the new Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia to which a number of Marxist-Leninist cadres, whom the right wing exposed to constant attacks, were not elected.

After the return of the Presidium of the CC CPCz from Moscow, talks full of controversies were held in Prague in connection with the preparation of the plenary session of the CC CPCz, which was to discuss and draw conclusions from the Moscow Protocol. A. Dubcek, O. Cernik, J. Smrkovsky and other rightist representatives approached the fulfilment of the Moscow Protocol irresponsibly and perfidiously. They essentially supported the results of the

illegal Vysocany Congress, although in the talks in Moscow they declared that they did not recognize its validity. At the same time, they co-ordinated their course with the organizers of this Congress from among which many were co-opted to the CC CPCz where they significantly strengthened the influence of the right wing. The right wing also benefited by a change in the composition of the Presidium of the CC CPCz which actually resulted in the recalling of Fr. Kriegel but, in consequence of behind-the-scenes machinations, comrades O. Svestka, D. Kolder, E. Rigo and A. Kapek were also deprived of their functions. It was a great mistake of the CC CPCz that it approved, at this session, the co-option of many rightist opportunist exponents to its ranks, as well as a numerous extension of the General Committee Presidium into which there also got a number of rightists.

In his speech at the August plenum of the CC CPCz, A. Dubcek justified by every possible means his opportunist course, obscured the content of the Moscow Protocol and evaded the commitments ensuing from it for our Party and state bodies. He adopted a conciliatory attitude to the illegal Vysocany Congress.

The CC CPCz declared this Congress at its session of September 25 to 26, 1969, to be invalid, characterized it as the result of inadmissible factional activities on the part of some members of the CC CPCz, the rightist majority of the City Committee of the CPCz in Prague and other rightist opportunist forces. By its resolution, it confirmed the invalidity of the factional assembly and annulled the non-class, anti-internationalist and anti-Party declaration of the Presidium of the CC CPCz of August 21, 1968.

The fact that, at its session on August 31, 1968, the CC CPCz approved the Moscow Protocol, was of far-reaching importance. A positive action of the August plenum of the CC CPCz was the fact that it co-opted Comrade G. Husak and Comrade L. Svoboda to the Central Committee and that it elected them to the Presidium of the CC CPCz. The principled stand taken by both comrades at the plenum decisively contributed to the fact that the Central Committee approved the Moscow Protocol and supported the program for the normalization of life in the country.

In order to achieve normalization, it was primarily necessary to rally all sound forces in the Party as well as outside the Party, for a decisive blow against the reactionary forces, to expose the rightist opportunists and their real designs, to defeat the right wing in open political struggle, to wrench from its hands the decisive positions and instruments of power, especially the mass media, and to extricate the broad strata of working people from its influence. The conditions under which this struggle was taking place were exceptionally difficult and complicated.

Many people had succumbed to ideological confusion and were

unable to free themselves from the emotions which had been incited and were being further revived, especially by the mass media. The slogan about "national unity" became a magic formula which served for terrorizing morally and politically honest communists and internationalist-minded working people. By its pressure and nationalist incitement, whose intensity became unbearable, the right wing inflicted unimaginable damage. It is thus responsible for the misfortune of many families whose members allowed themselves to be dragged into the whirl of nationalist and anti-Soviet spite, and some have even left the country.

In the first weeks after August 21, the rightist and anti-socialist forces were still very insolent and audacious. They trusted that in A. Dubcek, A. Cernik and other rightists in the leadership of the Party and of the state as well as in other links of the political system, who were pursuing a two-faced policy, they had support, and that by means of the media influencing public opinion they could essentially work in the spirit of the pre-August days without meeting with appropriate organized resistance.

However, the counter-revolutionary elements were not given much time to rejoice over certain successes they had initially attained after August 1968. A big spoke was put in their wheel by the approval of the treaty on the temporary stay of the Soviet troops in the CSSR, which was adopted by the National Assembly on October 18, 1968. The adoption of this treaty was an important political and psychological factor which gave all real communists and honest followers of socialism security and an impulse for the further struggle for cleansing and strengthening all socialist values.

This was also the case with the further effective help by the Soviet Union, which had an all-round character and was of vital importance for our country. The extraordinary deliveries of grain, oil, valuable non-ferrous metals and other raw materials ensured the functioning of our national economy and thwarted all sorts of speculations of rightist and anti-social forces linked with the political and other consequences of the disruption and chaos which they were deliberately creating. Of invaluable importance was the ideological assistance of the CPSU to the sound core of our Party whom truthful information and the Leninist standpoints of Soviet communists enabled to orientate themselves correctly in the complicated situation and to steel their principled and internationalist attitudes.

The Marxist-Leninist Left, which was newly forming itself, and its representatives in the Presidium and in the Secretariat of the CC CPCz, in the plenum of the CC CPCz and in the Party apparatus set themselves the aim to cleanse the Party and our entire social life from the deposit of revisionism, opportunism and nationalism, to deprive the anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary forces of

their influence, to fully restore and further develop the strength of our socialist system. Those sound forces which were constantly the target of attacks on the part of the right wing and the counter-revolutionary forces, put up against the petty-bourgeois slogan "unity of the nation" the only correct class conception of a revolutionary alliance of working people headed by the working class. In this they had to overcome, by patient work, mistrust and lack of understanding and to gradually win over to their side those honest comrades and citizens who had temporarily wavered in the days of August and were now seeking the truth.

However, the implementation of this conception was very difficult because the rightist opportunist forces were even after August 21 maintaining nearly all their positions and even strengthened them in a certain respect. In view of this, the sound core of the Party was forced to use also extraordinary forms of political struggle, the more so since the press, radio and television still remained in the hands of the right wing. An important role in the post-August period was played by the magazine *Zpravy* which was not only a significant factor of ideological work, but also became an important instrument for the organizational unification of all sound forces. At a time when the official Party press did not fulfil its mission and reflected Dubcek's political line of two faces, the magazine *Zpravy* was raising the revolutionary and class self-confidence of real communists whom it helped to create a purifying Marxist-Leninist current within the Party.

The internationalist Left began to switch over to an ever-growing extent from personal agitation to open political addresses and actions. In this connection, it is necessary to highly appreciate the courage and immeasurable initiative especially of many pre-war Party members who did not spare their energy in the fight for returning to the CPCz its revolutionary honor.

An important measuring of forces between the right wing and the Left took place in connection with the 51st anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. After many months, in which the rightist and anti-socialist elements were in every possible way stifling any public manifestation of friendship with the Soviet Union, public demonstrations were again held in honor of the Great October. On the other hand, however, it was also confirmed that the counter-revolution had not yet by far capitulated. It proved this by various acts of vandalism, destruction of monuments, by burning Soviet flags, and so on.

The first marked success of the Marxist-Leninist Left, upon which it could base its further initiative and activity, was the plenary session of the CC CPCz in November 1968. It results to a considerable extent narrowed down the scope of activities of rightist elements.

The fact that it was possible to put through a resolution which exposed the role of the anti-socialist forces before August and which openly characterized rightist opportunism as the main danger within the Party, was of great importance for the further development within the CPCz and the entire society. The discussion of the resolution by bodies and organizations of the CPCz speeded up the political differentiation and enabled the Left to defend and develop the Marxist-Leninist course of the Party at the Party forum.

A positive contribution were also further decisions of the November plenum. The creation of the Executive Committee of the Presidium of the CC CPCz restricted the influence of the right wing in the Party leadership and also made its further maneuvering more difficult. The establishment of the Bureau of the CC CPCz for the Direction of Party Work in the Czech Lands thwarted the intentions of the rightist opportunists to convene a so-called Congress of Czech communists and to split the CPCz according to the criterion of nationality. At this period, considerable efforts were made by its chairman, Comrade L. Strougal, in the Bureau of the CC CPCz and by many comrades in regions, districts and basic organizations in order that the right wing might gradually be squeezed out from the direction of lower Party bodies and that Party work in the Czech lands might be restored on communist principles. A positive role in the fight against rightist opportunist forces was in general played by the control and auditing commissions of the Party. The monopoly of the right wing in the sphere of the mass media was broken through by the creation of the magazine *Tribuna* as the organ of the Bureau of the CC CPCz, which in this difficult period linked up with the revolutionary and internationalist traditions of the Czechoslovak communist press.

In paralyzing the influence and the activities of the rightist representatives in the Party leadership, a highly active role was played by Comrade G. Husak whom the November 1968 plenum of the CC CPCz confirmed in the function of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia and elected member of the Executive Committee of the Presidium of the CC CPCz. G. Husak inscribed himself in the minds of the sound core of the Party and of all honest citizens of our socialist state by his firm and courageous stand in relation to the counter-revolution and by his consistently internationalist attitude in the solution of all questions which were connected with the restoration of comradely cooperation and ideological unity with the CPSU and other fraternal parties. In this connection, Comrade Husak's positive role asserted itself especially in the talks of the delegation of the CC CPCz with leading representatives of the CPSU in Moscow (October 1968) and Kiev (December 1968), where together with the Presi-

dent of the Republic, Comrade L. Svoboda, they significantly contributed to the restoration and consolidation of mutual trust.

After the November plenum, the right wing began to realize that it would increasingly lose ground and that the whole tissue of its conspiratorial machinations and intrigues would be gradually exposed, which would lead to the liquidation of its positions and its influence in our public life. It therefore used all levers in order to delay as much as possible its downfall and condemnation by the Czechoslovak people. Its platform was henceforth a policy of two faces. Outwardly it hypocritically recognized that it is necessary to strengthen and develop our socialist system and the ties of alliance of the CSSR with our allies, but in reality it persisted in its earlier positions. It protected and strengthened by all possible means its own set of people in the mass media and was pushing with great effort its cadres to the newly created governments of the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic, to the Czech National Council and the House of Nations, as well as to other bodies and institutions. It used every opportunity for organizing pressure campaigns and for evoking a permanent crisis both within the country as well as in relations to the allies. Its main effort was to constantly keep the situation at boiling point and the whole public in systematic tension and nervousness.

In pushing through their aims, the rightist opportunists managed also now, just as before August 1968, to shamelessly gamble with everything that was beneficial for the Republic and her people and that was to be a solid foundation in the stabilization of the socialist state. This applied also to the equitable adjustment of nationality relations within the framework of the federative set-up of the CSSR, which created the basis for really equal coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks. Evidence of this was also the noisy campaign around the election of the chairman of the newly constituted Federal Assembly.

When the rightist gamblers failed to push through J. Smrkovsky to the function of Chairman of the Federal Assembly, they concentrated their attention on the trade unions in an effort to transform them into an anti-Party and opposition force. They completed the dismemberment of the trade union movement and pushed through various adventurers, who had nothing in common with the interests of the working class, to leading positions. At the turn of 1968 and 1969, the revisionist circles used the tribune of many trade union congresses and assemblies for evoking strong pressure by which they wanted to force the adoption of the Law on the Enterprise and Enterprise Councils of Working People. This law was intended to result in the liquidation of central economic management and, under the guise of "direct producers' democracy," in

the establishment of enterprise particularism ignoring the interests of the entire society, and in squeezing the CPCz out of enterprises.

However, the disruptive activities of the rightist and anti-socialist forces continued after August 1968 on the entire economic front. They resulted in a constant intensification of earlier economic difficulties. For example, wholesale and retail prices were rising constantly and without control. The situation was moreover complicated by deliberately created shopping runs. The consequences of the continuing inflationary wave seriously affected especially those strata of the population whose incomes had not grown.

After the November 1968 plenum of the CC CPCz, the right wing recruited especially young people and students for a new round of pressure campaigns aimed against the process of normalization. It organized students' strikes, demonstrations, various memoranda and other actions in which expression was given to the ultimative demands of the rightist opportunist and anti-Soviet front. The psychosis whipped up among university students led also to the personal tragedy of the student Jan Palach, for whose death the representatives of the right wing bear full political and moral responsibility. This event became the impulse for the instigation of a new anti-Party and anti-Soviet convulsion which was intended to symbolize before the world resistance against the establishment of calm and order in our country. The notorious events in connection with the Ice Hockey Championships at the end of March 1969 proved that the counter-revolution was determined to go to any length in order to prevent the consolidation of the situation in our country, and that it was necessary to finally put an end to a situation in which our society was in the throes of continuous crises developing into catastrophic situations.

If a basic turn was to be achieved in the whole development, it was first of all necessary to solve the situation in the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia where a start had to be made by a radical change and rectification. The departure of A. Dubcek was an unconditional necessity if the Party and the entire society were not to continue to reel about in a vicious circle of constant states of crisis.

The purposefully developed efforts of the Marxist-Leninist forces within the Party created prerequisites for fundamental changes to be made in the leadership and in the policy of the Party, at the plenary session of the CC CPCz in April 1969, whose results were received with satisfaction and agreement by the majority of Czechoslovak communists. The recalling of A. Dubcek from the highest Party function and the election of G. Husak to the function of First Secretary of the CC CPCz opened a new stage in which the process of changes in the ratio of forces within the Party

acquired a qualitatively new level. Although the right wing still maintained significant positions in the newly elected Presidium, in the persons of A. Dubcek and O. Cernik, it had already lost determining influence in the leadership of the Party. The decisive initiative and activity within the CPCz passed irreversibly into the hands of the Marxist-Leninist Left.

Alexander Dubcek did not even in the further development help the Party in overcoming the difficult situation, nor did he self-critically re-assess his offences against the interests of the Party and its international obligations. Because of his anti-Party attitude and factional activities, which were incompatible with the Party Rules, he was in June 1970 expelled from the ranks of the CPCz.

The cadre changes in the Presidium and in the Secretariat of the CC CPCz after the April 1969 plenum of the CC CPCz created decisive prerequisites for overcoming the protracted crisis within the Party and society and for an offensive against the rightist opportunist and anti-socialist pressures. Appropriate interventions and measures strengthened the power organs of the socialist state which began to take resolute action against counter-revolutionary elements and violators of socialist legality. The mass media, from which the main exponents of the right wing were gradually removed, began to be controlled and influenced by Party and state bodies.

The May 1969 plenum of the CC CPCz discussed and approved the Implementation Directive which contained program tasks for the immediate period. The aim was:

- to defeat the right wing ideologically and organizationally, to restore Party unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and to fully liquidate the positions of the anti-socialist forces in society;

- to restore and strengthen internationalist ties with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and to regain the authority of the CPCz in the international communist movement;

- to develop the role of the socialist state and to strengthen its bodies;

- to ensure the leading role of the Party in the political system of the National Front and to return to this system its socialist character;

- to halt the inflation and to achieve a gradual consolidation of the national economy.

In order to ensure these aims, it was essential to lay down correct tactics which would make it possible to avoid both overcautiousness as well as radicalist moods. This alone could create prerequisites for the Marxist-Leninist Left to become stronger, and for the growth of its influence. This at the same time created optimum conditions for the broadest masses to gradually find out for them-

selves about the double-dealing character of Dubcek's policy and the sincere efforts of the new leadership to solve the vital interests of the people and to lead the Party and society out of shocks of crisis.

In fulfilling the tasks of the Implementation Directive, the Marxist-Leninist forces were gaining and extending their positions in the Party bodies, whereas many representatives of the right wing had to resign their functions or were deprived of them as a result of their defeat. Thanks to comrades who took up leading positions in the mass media, their tone and orientation changed. Gradually, the public began to learn about the real background of the so-called process of revival and democratization and to find out about the perniciousness of the dishonest policy of the rightist leaders.

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the events of August, rightist and counter revolutionary elements in Prague and other places once again instigated street disturbances and hostile actions against the Party, its political course and our socialist allies. However, this measuring of strength had a catastrophic outcome for the reactionary forces and rightists, as they suffered a crushing defeat. They failed in their attempt to provoke open mass resistance because the majority of people whom they had earlier succeeded in deceiving had already seen through their adventurous game and thus the main force on which they could rely was the criminal underworld. The fact that the disturbances of August 1969 were frustrated by the resolute course of the Party and government bodies, and that they were liquidated by our own means of power, was not only the expression of the advancing consolidation of our social life but at the same time raised the feeling of confidence of communists and all honest followers of socialism. The resolute intervention of the People's Militia, the security body and members of our army proved that if the leadership of the Party is firm and resolute, it can rely on the strength of these armed components.

At its sessions of September 1969 and January and June 1970, the CC CPCz cleansed its ranks of rightist officials and adopted a number of measures which created the necessary basis for further development of the political and ideological struggle aimed at overcoming the revisionist and opportunist ballast and for ensuring the further sound development of our socialist society.

Within a relatively short period of time, planned management of the national economy was again strengthened, the market was stabilized, the prospects of economic bankruptcy were averted and essential conditions were created for an upward development of the economy. In response to an appeal of the CC CPCz, broad active participation and initiative of working people developed with the aim of raising production and social productivity of labor. An im-

portant contribution to the stabilization of the Czechoslovak national economy was made by further assistance on the part of the Soviet Union.

Of far-reaching importance was the decision of the January 1970 plenary session of the CC CPCz on the exchange of Party cards. The great struggle for saving socialism in the CSSR and against all attempts to liquidate the Party as a Marxist-Leninist and internationalist force subjected every Czechoslovak communist to a test. The result of this test became the main part of the individual assessment of the overall attitudes of every Party member at Party interviews. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia parted with more than one-fifth of its former members who did not pass the test in the critical period, because their stands did not correspond to the demands placed upon communists. The check-up resulted in an organizational strengthening and ideological consolidation of the whole Party, and created conditions for the fulfilment of its historical mission of the vanguard of socialist society.

Together with the advancing consolidation of the internal life of the Party and the state, the international political position of the CSSR was also strengthened and the international authority of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the communist movement was restored. The stand taken by the delegation of our Party at the Moscow International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, in June 1969, left no doubt that the CPCz will, in harmony with its traditions, effectively contribute to the strengthening of Marxist-Leninist unity and the action capacity of world communism.

In the course of 1969 and 1970, comradely relations were fully restored and expanded between the CSSR and the CPCz and the other socialist countries and their fraternal parties. Today, they are firmer and deeper than at any time in the past.

The basis of the internationalist ties of our Party and the Czechoslovak state is our fraternal solidarity with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR. This Leninist unity of interests and aims of our two parties and countries was also expressed by the new treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union, of May 6, 1970, which reaffirms the determination of our nations to always go along a common road with the Soviet comrades and never otherwise.

In the last period, thousands of members and functionaries of the Party waged a courageous and selfless fight in which they spared no effort to cleanse the shield of their Party and restore its Marxist-Leninist character. For this they quite rightly deserve appreciation. However, the danger on the part of rightist opportunism, which was actually organizationally crushed, has by no means passed and it will still require a lot of time and effort before its influence is fully overcome.

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The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is closing a period of the development of our Party and of the entire socialist society. It is a period filled with selfless efforts of the Party and all working people to build an all-round rich and happy life for the citizens of our homeland. It is at the same time a period in which our Party and society, every communist, every citizen, old and young, has passed through a historical test of the firmness and strength of his socialist convictions. In the sharp political struggle with revisionist, opportunist and counter-revolutionary forces, we learned to discern friend from foe, in order that we may separate chaff from the grain and crush the attempt at a counter-revolutionary reversal, from the mortal embrace of which we escaped by a mere hair's breadth, thanks to the internationalist assistance of the fraternal socialist countries.

The lessons drawn from the great tests, struggles and hard fights commit our Party, every communist, every honest socialist-minded citizen of our country to protect and develop socialism and never again to permit anyone to threaten it, no matter how pleasing the words and slogans he may use as a cover. This is our revolutionary, national, class and internationalist duty.

The guarantee of this can only be a communist party which stands firmly on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, a party steeled in class struggle with the enemy, cleansed of all influences of opportunism and revisionism, a party which by its clear and realistic policy expresses the most noble aspirations and aims of the working man. We are deeply aware of the Leninist principle that the strength of our Party lies in its connection with the people. We joined the ranks of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia of our own free will and we assumed a responsibility before our own people as well as before all progressive forces throughout the world. We want to fulfil this demanding task of communists with honor. We regard this as our sacred duty—to fight and work with the people for the people, for its welfare and peaceful life. This is the bequest of the revolutionary and internationalist traditions of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the bequest of the best sons of the Party, of Kl. Gottwald, which represent the inviolable basis of the existence and strength of our Party in all its fifty-years-long existence. These principles are followed by the course upon which the Central Committee of the CPCz embarked after April 1969 and which it is consistently implementing in its policy.

We are a firm component of the world socialist community. Our successes in the past and our road ahead are closely linked with the first country of the socialist revolution—with the Soviet Union. Without its assistance, we could not have solved and coped with the complicated and great tasks that were and are required by

socialist development in our country. Drawing a lesson from the bitter past, we shall protect like the apple of our eye the sacred bequest of the progressive forces of our nations and the alliance with the Soviet Union, the guarantee of our national, social and state sovereignty.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is deeply convinced that all communists will also in future be unswerving fighters for the realization of the present policy of the Party, that they will win over for its implementation every honest citizen—worker, farmer and member of the intelligentsia.

Years will pass, time will heal many things and cover them with other events. However, what will remain are the results of the heroic and selfless efforts of the people, the great work of socialist construction created under the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; what will remain is the Party which will continue to lead the nations to an even better future. Every honest citizen of our Republic must strive for our children, grandchildren, the entire future generation, to be filled with pride in the work of their fathers and mothers, so that they may develop and enhance their bequest. This is not, and will not be, an easy road. It is a pioneer road, a road calling for heroism, selflessness and self-denial. However, it is a road of honor, glory and a future which leads to the fulfilment of the aspirations of every citizen to live a contented and happy life.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, forward to further construction of socialism in our homeland!

MAIN TASKS FACING THE PARTY AFTER THE EXCHANGE OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP CARDS

REPORT OF THE PRESIDIUM DELIVERED BY COMRADE
GUSTAV HUSAK AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON DECEMBER 10, 1970.

Dear Comrades,

The Presidium of the Central Committee is submitting to you for assessment a written report on its activity, on how we have been implementing the line of the Central Committee since the last plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. We planned to convene a plenary meeting of the Central Committee at the beginning of autumn, but evaluation of the great intra-party action and the preparation of important documents which are being submitted to the plenary meeting today, have taken longer.

When assessing the development in this country since the last plenary meeting of the Central Committee, we can say that the line of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is being successfully implemented.

The process of overcoming the crisis phenomena and the process of consolidation within the Party, just as in society, in political life and in the sphere of our economy, has significantly advanced in all respects. In all sectors, we can register a progressive development which favorably affects the whole life of the working people. Step by step, month after month, in one sphere after another, we are purposefully eliminating the consequences of the crisis of the past years, the elements of disruption, anarchy, uncontrolled development and uncertainty, the consequences of the activities of opportunist revisionist forces. A state of legal order, organized peaceful work, plan-based development, political, legal and social security and prospects is being ensured. Naturally, this development has not yet been completed. Much has already been done, but there are numerous tasks still ahead of us.

The task set by the plenary sessions of the Communist Party Central Committee in April and May 1969—to lead our Party and society out of the crisis—could be carried out only through a great political struggle within the Party and society. The aim of the strug-

gle was to preserve the revolutionary gains of our people after World War Two, to protect and maintain the victory of the working class and its power in our state, to maintain and enhance the results of socialist construction in Czechoslovakia, the internationalist unity with fraternal parties, with the socialist states, and primarily with the Soviet Union. This concerned the great perspective of the construction of a most progressive social order without exploiters and parasites, in which the working class, cooperative farmers and other strata of the working people create optimum conditions for the development of production, culture and the standard of living, for the development of socialist democracy and a free life of the working man. The purpose was to restore and invigorate the leading role of the vanguard of the working class—the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia—as the organizer of the victory of the working class and the working people. For these causes our party has been waging a revolutionary struggle for the full 50 years of its existence. All this was threatened by the onslaught of right wing, revisionist, anti-socialist forces in the years 1968-1969.

Individual people make mistakes, it is possible to criticize them for it and make changes in responsible posts. But the working class and its political vanguard, the Communist Party, cannot retreat from their basic class positions, from their revolutionary traditions, ideals and aims, without catastrophic consequences for their policy and existence.

We may characterize the period since April 1969 as a fierce struggle of Marxist-Leninist, leftist forces in our Party against right opportunism, as an absolute victory of these forces in our society. The principle has again been confirmed in this struggle that we may be patient and sensitive with regard to confused individuals, but that we must not tolerate opportunist, revisionist views and groups within the Party and activities of anti-socialist forces in society, because that would be the seed of new problems and new crises. In ideology and in the policy of the Marxist-Leninist party and the working class it is not possible to sit on two stools: to profess Marxism-Leninism, while permitting its revisionist subversion in whatever "reformatory" guise. Since April 1969, our Central Committee has fully re-established, by its resolutions, the class approach and class assessment of social phenomena and categories within our state, and in the approach to international problems. In this it has linked up with the finest revolutionary traditions of our party from the time of the class struggles in the bourgeois republic before the war, from the time of the national liberation struggle; it has linked up with the victorious progress of our working class and the working people after the liberation of our state; it has linked up with the victory of the working people in February 1948 and the revolution-

ary changes in our society in the years of the construction of socialism.

It may be said, I think, that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has thus fulfilled, shortly before the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of our party, its class, political and moral duties towards hundreds of thousands of revolutionary fighters of the communist and workers' movement in our state, who lived and died for the victory of the working class, for the building of a socialist society. It is thus fulfilling also its historical responsibility towards our working class, towards millions of working people, creating conditions for their free and happy life, for the development of their material, social and cultural requirements and for the future of the young generation.

Together with this struggle against the disruptive forces, our party, as the leading political force in society, had to solve all problems of our society. With the progressing defeat of right-wing and anti-socialist forces, with the overcoming of crisis phenomena and their causes in various spheres, the conceptual elaboration of accumulated political, social and economic problems, the concentration of forces on the planned development of our socialist society emerges with increasing strength.

The past, the present and the future cannot be separated by a clearly defined line. From the past we are drawing lessons for our present work. We link up with everything positive and want to avoid previous mistakes. With our present work we are laying foundations for the entire future development. Such is the process of social development, which is particularly complicated in an advanced cultural, highly organized socialist society. We speak about the mistakes and shortcomings of the past to avoid their repetition by recognizing them, and with this improved knowledge to be able to overcome their consequences.

Today, we are orientating more and more Party, social and state bodies on the elaboration of the future development of our society, on perspective development. From the disruption and confusion, from the crises through which our party and society have passed, emerges more and more clearly a bright perspective for our people and society. The success of the new course of the Central Committee in all spheres restores on a wide scale the confidence of the working class, cooperative farmers and the other strata of the working people in the policy of the party, the principles of socialism, it strengthens their self-confidence and their pride in the results of the fifty years' work of our party, in the twenty-five years of building socialism in Czechoslovakia.

Millions of our workers, farmers and the other working people have tested in practice, in everyday life, in their own experiences

over the past one-and-a-half years that the political course started by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in April 1969 is realistic, correct and that there is no other, better alternative. They have become convinced that the decisions of the Central Committee are being put into practice, that there is no contradiction between words and deeds.

All this strengthens the socialist order in our state and strengthens also the position of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak people and our state in the socialist camp and in the rest of the world.

We regard this development as the main characteristic feature of the period since April 1969, markedly strengthened since the last session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

I

The stability of socialist society and its further development are closely connected with the situation inside the political vanguard of the working class—the Communist Party. It was possible to lead our Party from the ideological and organizational disintegration only by the defeat of right-wing and revisionist forces inside the Party. Only in this way could the ideological, organizational and action unity of the Party be restored on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, and its leading role in our society be renewed.

After the first steps, after we clarified the basic ways out of the crisis and disruption, when we revoked the incorrect decisions and resolutions, after we revealed to the working class and the other working people the real aims and the true face of the right-wing and anti-socialist forces, it was necessary to cleanse the ranks of our Party from those who had parted from the Marxist-Leninist policy of the Party and betrayed its ideological and organizational principles.

We started in a situation when the Party was ideologically and organizationally disintegrated, when it was in the throes of various ideological streams and platforms, when its realization capability was small and the confidence of the people in the Party strongly disrupted. The main exponents of the right wing were gradually removed from decisive posts in Party, state and social bodies and organizations. The influence, operation and number of those who stood on the positions of Marxist-Leninist policy was increasing, and the active of resolute fighters for such policy of the party was forming and growing. With the gradual high-principled and patient political work inside the Party and in society conditions were ripening for the Party to be able to dissociate politically and organiza-

tionally from those who had abandoned the Marxist-Leninist principles of its policy and contributed to creating the crisis situation.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia of January this year on the exchange of Party membership cards under the principles contained in the Letter to all primary organizations and Party members was the decisive measure for cleansing the Party.

Today we can submit to the Central Committee the general conclusion of this important political action of our Party. It was an exceptionally important and complicated test of the entire Party, its political, ideological and organizational abilities. Today it may be said that our Party has passed the test with success. The experience gained in the exchange of Party membership cards is immensely valuable for our work.

In connection with the exchange of Party cards the Central Committee laid down at its January session the task

—to cleanse the Party of those who have parted from the Marxist-Leninist policy and consistently violated or failed to fulfil the Party Statutes;

—to restore the ideological and organizational unity of the Party on the principles of Marxist-Leninist teaching, to increase its action ability, revolutionary militancy and activity.

To hold interviews with more than one million five hundred thousand Party members with a Communist high-principled approach and sensitiveness made great demands on the control of the whole action by Party bodies at all levels, on the cadres, on political-organizational work and control activity. In the course of the action it became clear that the Party has at all levels a sufficient number of staunch comrades standing on the positions of Marxism-Leninism, who were resolved to fulfil the exacting task despite all stratagems and obstacles of the rightist forces. Altogether 70,217 groups were set up in primary organizations, districts, regions and in the center to conduct the interviews, which were made up of 235,270 members and functionaries. Old, experienced Party members were a great help in this action. The main brunt of the work and responsibility in the practical implementation of the interviews rested with this Party active. With its selflessness, this great Party active contributed to a decisive extent towards the fulfilment of the resolution of the Central Committee, towards the fulfilment of the aims of the exchange of Party cards. Permit me, from this platform, to thank on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party the hundreds of thousands of comrades who helped the Party selflessly in this exceptionally exacting action.

To prevent the course of the exchange of Party cards from being diverted from the set tasks and line, it was necessary to control this mass campaign carefully from the beginning, to guide it and remove

ascertained shortcomings. In this campaign, our regional, town and district Party committees showed a high degree of political and organizational ability, they gained great experience and improved their work.

The political and organizational experience which the party bodies at all levels gained during the exchange of Party cards should not be allowed to fall into oblivion, but should be creatively developed in our further work. It has been proved that when the Party concentrates its efforts on a clear objective, when it leads along the correct political line and organizes the work well, it can achieve great results.

For an evaluation of this collective mass political action and of the experiences from the work with the people, we chose the course of each primary organization evaluating politically the results of the exchange of Party cards, and of district committees of the Party assessing this work politically at their plenary sessions. Similarly, the regional Party committees evaluated the results falling under the competence of the regional organization. The Presidium of the Central Committee discussed at its sessions separately the results of each regional Party organization and of city organizations in Prague and Bratislava, in each case in the presence of the leading secretary. In this way the experience of the whole Party was evaluated.

The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia today submits to the Central Committee a written report on the course and the results of the exchange of Party membership cards, which contains the course of the action, the numerical results, experience and conclusions for the further work of the Party. We are of the opinion that this year's exchange of Party membership cards has fulfilled its mission. The aims set by the January Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia have been achieved.

The most important result of this action is the cleansing of the Party, the crushing of the centers and nests of rightist opportunism and revisionism within the Party. The Party has severed organizational ties with those who had abandoned the principles of Marxism-Leninism. To a considerable extent, the Party also got rid of those who had been passive and indifferent for a long period of time, and represented a potential reserve for opportunism in the Party.

With the departure of right-wing opportunists and a part of passive members, conditions have been created for building the Party and the Party's unity on a qualitatively higher level, for the necessary restoration of full-blooded intra-Party life. Conditions have been created for a more consistent implementation of Leninist norms in the life of the Party, for increasing the action ability of the Party. It has been possible to restore the links between district

committees and primary organizations, discontinued for many years, or existing only formally. Claims on the political involvement of leading workers in all sections have been raised. Accountability to the Party for the entrusted sections has been increased.

The shift in public opinion, increased confidence in the Party's policy and greater involvement of the working people, especially in the economic section, may also be regarded as a positive phenomenon of the course of the exchange of Party membership cards.

The Party has also learned more thoroughly about the roots of the shortcomings and mistakes in its internal life, the causes of the crisis phenomena in its activity. The interviews with members have revealed that the passivity of many years is the consequence of low politico-organizational and educational work. Inadequate knowledge of the general policy of the Party, a low ideological level of certain members, and even ignorance of the basic questions of Marxism-Leninism have appeared in many places. There has also been inadequate knowledge of the Party Statutes as the fundamental law of internal life of Party organizations and members. And in certain places also tendencies of liberalism and reluctance to be involved in work for the Party's policy even among some leading workers.

The form of interviews has enabled the Party bodies to get a better knowledge of every communist, his political and human profile and to acquaint every Party member with its policy, the situation in our society and with the Leninist principles of the construction and work of the Party.

In the course of the interviews, it was decided not to issue new membership cards to 326,817 members, i.e., 21.67 per cent of the number of members at the beginning of the action. Of this number, 67,147 persons were expelled from the Party; in 259,670 cases membership was annulled. By this differentiation (expelling from the Party or annulling membership), the interviewing commissions and Party organs differentiated the degree of culpability, wavering or indifference to the teaching and tasks of our Party.

When we allow for the decrease of membership in the years 1968-1969, the present membership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is lower by 473,731 members, i.e., 28 per cent, compared with the January 1, 1968 figure. Our Party still remains a mass-membership party: after the exchange of Party cards, it has approximately 1,200,000 members.

The action of the exchange of Party membership cards was carried out in the spirit of the resolution of the Central Committee in a correct and high-principled way, with a sensitive approach to people. There has been no serious violation of the principles laid down for the exchange of Party membership cards. In such an enormous action, mistakes and erroneous decisions cannot be ruled out in individual cases. That is why provisions have been made for possible

appeal to Party organs. Appeals against expulsion from the Party and objections against annulling membership are dealt with by control and auditing commissions and pertinent Party bodies under our Statutes.

The completion of the interviews and the exchange of the Party cards gives rise to a new situation in the Party, to new conditions for its further life and work. The higher degree of ideological and organizational unity enables the Party to fulfil the tasks following from its leading role in socialist society much more resolutely.

It can be said that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is now once more a Marxist-Leninist party, that it is a political force capable of carrying out its leading role in our society, that it is an ideological center, a cognitive and controlling center of our society. The Party has gained confidence in its own strength and is gaining ever wider confidence among the masses of the working people.

Proceeding from these prerequisites and findings gained during the exchange of Party cards, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia found it necessary, as expressed in its Standpoint of September 18, 1970 to:

- abolish the exceptional forms connected with the exchange of Party cards and go over in the whole Party to the normal way and usual methods of Party work and life;
- direct the work of all Party bodies and organizations towards developing Party life, towards the further strengthening of the Marxist-Leninist character of the Party, towards a purposeful and organized implementation of the role of the Party in individual spheres of society and particularly towards mass-political work, towards gaining the working people for the policy of the Party.

The Standpoint of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has been discussed by all Party bodies, organizations and Party actives; it was adopted as a directive which stems from the present requirements of the Party and is directed to further work. We are convinced that the Central Committee will confirm this directive.

I shall refer to certain conclusions which follow from the exchange of Party cards in connection with other tasks of our Party.

The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia recommends that the Central Committee approve the submitted report on the course of the exchange of Party cards and thus conclude this great Party action.

II

Comrades,

Our successes in consolidating the Party, society and the state are proportionate to the degree to which we are successful in

overcoming the mistakes and crisis phenomena of the past in politics and the economy, and their reflection in the minds of the people. When assessing future tasks which are facing us, new problems are emerging, increased claims are made on the standard of managerial work in the Party and the state, on the conceptual and program character of this work, on the education of communists, on strengthening the unity of the Party, on uniting the Party with the masses of the working people. Our present and future tasks make it imperative for us to speed up the process of consolidation in all spheres, to settle with the past as quickly as possible and to devote all attention and energy to the tasks of today and tomorrow.

We must combine the defeat of the rightist and revisionist forces also with the elimination of mistakes and shortcomings which made possible the shaping, activities and offensive of these forces, with the elimination of methods which in the past impeded the work of our Party. To speed up this process it is necessary to recognize the sources, roots and causes of the crisis in this country and to arm the Party not only against a repetition of the crisis development, but especially for a Marxist-Leninist, critical assessment of every social phenomenon at the present time and in future.

This is why we have been returning, at practically every meeting of the Central Committee since April last year, to the recent past too, so as to draw obligatory lessons for our further work from the good and bad in our recent development. The lessons which we are drawing from past developments are not only concerned with the evaluation of standpoints and the activity of some individuals, whatever may be their responsibility for the development; we are concerned with exposing the roots of those tendencies and mistakes which led the Party and society into crisis situations and finally into catastrophic positions.

The entire Party and all society must see that all that is positive in our revolutionary traditions and in the construction of socialism can be further developed only if we deal in all their consequences with that which disarmed politically, ideologically and organizationally and disorganized the Party as the leading social force in socialist society, that which enabled revisionist and anti-socialist forces to grow, which enabled them to create a counter-revolutionary threat to the whole of our socialist system.

Since April 1969, the Central Committee, its Presidium, together with the Party active have exerted great effort to clarify to the Party, the working class and all working people the causes of the crisis in our society, which climaxed in the year 1968 in a direct threat of counter-revolution.

In conjunction with the evaluation and the conclusions which

the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted, especially at the meeting in September 1969 and in January 1970, Party organs and organizations have worked out their own analyses of the crisis development. The interviews during the exchange of Party cards of one-and-a-half million Party members have helped further to expose and specify the operation of right-wing and anti-socialist forces in the Party and society.

The accumulated experiences and information enable us today to start generalizing this collective finding of the Party. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is therefore submitting to the plenary session for discussion and approval a political document entitled "Lessons drawn from the crisis development in the Party and society after the 13th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia." This document is to serve the Party for instruction and to contribute to its further political, ideological and organizational unification, to strengthen its Marxist-Leninist character, to invigorating its leading role and to a successful development of our socialist society.

It may serve also fraternal communist and workers' parties, democratic and peace-loving forces in the world in learning about and understanding the development in Czechoslovakia as well as certain broader contexts of the class struggle of the working people to build a socialist society.

We have spoken several times at meetings of the Central Committee and on other occasions about the need for an analysis of our development. In this respect we have started preparatory work. It has proved to be beyond the scope of the activity of the Central Committee (we cannot re-evaluate the congresses of our party) as well as more than it can cope with to make an analysis of the development of the Party and society over long years and in various sections in a short period of time. The outcome would be a document the scope of which would hardly be accessible to a large number of our members and the working people. Consequently, the Presidium of the Central Committee finally came to the opinion that the main purpose of such analytical work is to draw conclusions and lessons from the crisis development in the Party and society, clarify to the Party members, the working class and the working people the decisive stages of the development after the 13th congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, both before and especially after January 1968; to orientate Party members, and the working people in this respect.

We are in no case concerned with self-expedient returning to the past, with exposing the wounds and sore spots in our development. We are concerned with the Leninist approach to our own

mistakes, with recognizing and overcoming them. Everybody knows the words of V. I. Lenin, who said, after the victory of Soviet power, that nothing can destroy us except our own mistakes. Glancing back at certain chapters of our development before January 1968, and especially after that date, literally confirms Lenin's words, how our own mistakes, the mistakes in decisive key Party bodies, led to a development which brought the Party and society to a catastrophic position.

We regard it therefore as our duty, our debt to the Party and the working class and the other strata of the working people, to look with Leninist straightforwardness into the various stages and key periods of the crisis development in this country after the 13th Congress of the Party and to draw lessons and conclusions from it for overcoming all negative tendencies, mistakes, errors and deformities.

The document which has been submitted to you will, after approval by the Central Committee, be made available to all Party organizations which will study it in detail. It is therefore not necessary to comment here on the individual parts, stages or lessons. A responsible group of comrades, charged by the Presidium of the Central Committee, has been working on the document for some time. The Presidium of the Central Committee discussed drafts of the document several times and assessed it critically from various aspects, both in its entirety and in part. The draft which we are submitting today is the outcome of this long-lasting work and is the unanimous standpoint of the Central Committee Presidium.

Marxism-Leninism does not view history as a chain of events determined by destiny. On the contrary, it emphasizes strongly the active creative role of the people. The possibility of influencing developments, history, of changing the world, as Marx says, is at the same time a great historical responsibility. The first prerequisite of correct active influencing is the recognition of contexts, a correct orientation. The "Lessons" which we are discussing at the present session of the Central Committee lay bare the roots of dangers and obstacles in socialist development, what should be avoided and what are the sources of the strength of the Party, the people, on which the stability of the socialist social system depends and what methods of work lead to success or failure.

Enemies have been attempting to draw false conclusions about the socialist social order from our mistakes and the crisis development. It is natural that the internal or external enemy always tries to take advantage of our mistakes. The submitted document and all our findings clearly show the advantages and successes of socialist construction in Czechoslovakia. The mistakes which occurred in this country were in the people and in the system

of their work. The people, who failed in responsible posts, had to leave political and public life—and this law will certainly be valid in the future too. We are gradually working out a Leninist style and system of work, which is exacting, critical and self-critical.

The submitted material is a summary, a specification of the conclusions of the Central Committee and the work of the whole Party over the past one-and-a-half years. We are returning to the past to be able to draw a lesson from it, to close this past, and with the knowledge acquired to be able to concentrate all our attention on the tasks of the present and the future.

We must focus the attention of the entire Party on the future, on the further development of society, on strengthening the features of its socialist character, on developing the economy and the standard of living of the people. Only in this way, in concrete work for today and tomorrow, can we overcome the mistakes of the past and put into practice the lessons which we have gained from it. The lessons drawn from the past are to enable the entire Party to march more steadfastly, in greater unity and with greater resolve along the road on which we set out in April 1969.

III

Comrades,

Permit me now to turn attention to the main tasks of our Party in the decisive spheres of society.

1. It is essential to further strengthen the unity of the Party, from the Central Committee to the primary organizations. It is no coincidence that we give priority to this task. The right-wing forces could not have got so far in their disruptive policy if the Party had not put up with formalism for a long time, if consistent action had been taken against all efforts to disrupt the Party's unity.

The Party's unity is not a state which can be established once and for all. A constant struggle must be waged for it. Most important is ideological unity. Under our conditions this means to resolutely combat opportunism, revisionism, the influences of bourgeois ideology and customs, marked by bourgeois morale, to wage a struggle for Marxism-Leninism, for its application in practice, for proletarian internationalism. If the Party is to operate as a unified body, it is necessary to fight for its organizational unity, for each Party member to fulfil his duties, to be guided by the Party statutes, by the Leninist norms of Party life. It is further necessary to achieve unity in tactical procedure, action unity. The struggle for this unity means at present to see that there is unified information, a unified interpretation of the resolutions of Party bodies, and that all intra-Party questions are solved on Party soil, in keeping with the line laid down by the Party's Central Committee. Observance of the set

course is primarily necessary because this ensures implementation of the resolutions, confidence in Party bodies, and an atmosphere which influences positively the involvement and initiative of communists and the other working people. Violation of these principles brings unrest into society and the Party itself, causes misgivings as to the validity and the binding character of resolutions, and diverts attention from the solution of important problems. That is why we must resolutely oppose violation of these principles in the whole Party.

All these aspects of unity must be understood in their mutual context. It is not sufficient only to proclaim agreement with the program and the political course of the party and neglect united action or disregard those norms of Party life which make the Party a firmly knit organism. If we say that communists must be high-principled, it means that they must not only proclaim their adherence to Marxism-Leninism, but also behave and live like communists. We are laying stress on the strengthening of discipline. The point is that communists should fulfil their tasks on the basis of their inner identification with the policy of the Party, of being deeply convinced of its correctness, and that, consequently, they are concerned that the Party's policy should be consistently implemented in all sectors. Where there is contradiction between words and deeds, between proclaimed aims and methods of work, the unity of the Party, and with it also its policy and authority among the masses, is in peril.

We are submitting to the Central Committee for consideration a draft resolution on the unity of the Party. I emphasize again: attention to the question of the unity of our Party stems in the first place from the lessons drawn from the recent past, when the struggle for the unity of the Party, this permanent task, was strongly underestimated. This mistake cannot be repeated. The completion of all-round consolidation and the further development of all spheres of our society requires that the Party be a firm, organized force, that it be knit together by unity of will, of action and conscious discipline. Only in this way will it be possible to complete the struggle against right-wing opportunism and revisionism and lead the Party so that its bodies pass over to systematic, purposeful and planned activity, so that the obligations which the Party has towards the working class, the broad masses of the working people, can be implemented.

If the Central Committee approves the proposed resolution, it will have to be implemented consistently in the life and work of every organization, every Party member.

2. The results of the interviews and the experience that has been gained have shown the unavoidability of consistent observance of

the Party Statutes. It is necessary to renew to their full extent the Leninist principles of Party work, to develop democratic centralism and intra-Party democracy, to create scope for criticism and self-criticism and to purposefully apply collective decision-making. High demands when assessing the results of the activity of every member must be introduced into the Party, and conclusions drawn when any communists try to evade their duties. All communists are bound by the principles stemming from the Party Statutes that intra-Party questions are discussed and decided in Party bodies, at Party meetings, and the decisions are binding for all. In all our further work, in the process of solving particular problems of the construction of socialism, with the growing demands, every member of the Party will be checked in the first place by his work, its quality, and how conscientiously he implements the policy of the Party in the section entrusted to him, how responsibly he works and how he behaves. We must assess people not by their words, by their own characteristics, what they say about themselves, but primarily according to their deeds, what contribution they make towards implementing the Party's policy in practice.

Opportunism begins where requirements are gradually lessened, where people preserve a quiet life, where they do not want to commit themselves for a new thing in which certain risks are entailed, where all try to be on good terms with others just for peace of mind, to avoid difficulties. Where courage is lacking to point out mistakes, to criticize shortcomings, mistakes are tolerated and shortcomings are connived at. Criticizing on the side will not rectify mistakes. Communists must stand up for the new cause openly, however unpopular it might be, care for the good name of the Party, be able to face up to a real mistake and not to connive at any activity aiming against the interests of society, against socialism. We shall have to see to it that people who behave in such a high-principled way are raised to responsible functions and are supported. This, too, is an important lesson from the struggle against opportunism.

3. A general finding made during the exchange of Party cards is the fact that in the past period, work with Party members was inadequate, the feeling of responsibility of the member for the Party and the Party for the member was weakened. Contact of higher Party bodies with primary organizations was inadequate. The key links are primarily district Party committees. In the process of the exchange of Party cards, higher Party bodies, especially district committees, established closer contacts with primary organizations and devoted greater care to them. It is necessary for district Party committees to be in regular contact with primary organizations, for them to take advantage of the strength of the active, which was

formed in the course of the exchange of Party cards, and ensure regular contact with all primary organizations and Party members. District committees must look after this active, arm it politically and ideologically, complement and improve and purposefully organize its work to help primary organizations.

This is closely connected with the question of activating primary organizations and Party members, or rather their permanent active communist influencing and activity. Certain positive results have already been achieved. However, we cannot be satisfied with them. Part of the members took upon themselves Party tasks or made pledges at the interviews. This method and the charging of members with specific tasks may become one of the methods of raising Party activity. The Party duty of a communist is a concrete expression of his involvement in political life and his place of work, an expression of permanently intensifying connection between the Party and the masses of the working people. It should be said openly that passive members—though they are healthy people, cannot be needed or tolerated in the Party.

4. A Party member is obligated to work and behave as a communist at his place of work, in the place where he lives and everywhere else. In this there were considerable shortcomings. Part of the Party members were active at their places of work, but in the place of their residence no one often even knew that they were members of the Party. And the Party applies its policy not only at the place of work, but also in towns and in the countryside, through national committees, through social and other organizations. The influence of the Party is needed in all places, the work of each particular communist is needed everywhere. This is why the measure was adopted on the obligatory registration of every Party member in the place of his residence. The reason for this measure is that political and public life in towns and in villages be activated, that the work of the national committees and social organizations might improve. This question is very urgent, especially in the countryside, where many communists live; they go to work in the towns, but do not work politically at their places of residence. The registration of Party members in places of residence should be completed by the end of this year and the active political life in towns and in the countryside should be intensified. It is necessary to insist consistently on the fulfilment of this task and to control it.

5. One of the basic prerequisites of forming the Party is consistent control of the growth of the membership base. With the growth and renewal of its ranks the Party must strengthen the class, revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist character, ensure that the leading role of the Party be applied to a high degree in all spheres of the life of the society.

The developments of the past years and the exchange of Party cards are indicating serious shortcomings in the social and age structure of the membership.

In the further growth of the Party it will therefore be necessary, when admitting new members, to orientate on:

- workers and cooperative farmers who have proved their political attitudes towards the Party and socialism in the recent period and who meet the conditions for becoming active members of the Party;
- members of the youth who profess the ideals of communism and proletarian internationalism. To orientate in this especially on youth in factories and cooperative farms and members of the Socialist Union of Youth;
- especially on those branches and sections of economic activity where the Party exerts an inadequate influence and has an unsatisfactory social composition.

In admitting new members, Party organizations should be guided by long-lasting acquaintance with the proposed person at his place of work, by his public and political activity and by the evaluation of the collective of communists, who work or live with him and can assess objectively his attitudes and activity.

The Party is the vanguard of the working class. It must therefore purposefully strengthen its worker character. This presumes devoting much greater care to strengthening the workers' core of the Party and being concerned very specifically with effective Marxist-Leninist education, as well as with a thorough use of the talents and experience of well-proved workers.

Questions of the growth of the membership base and the social composition of the Party and certain other suggestions in this connection will be dealt with in more detail in the preparations for the Party's congress.

6. The success of our efforts to strengthen the unity of the Party at a higher level depends primarily on the maturity of the people. That is why we put into the forefront the education of cadres and a high-principled cadre policy as a whole. In the Standpoint of September 18, 1970, we said clearly that now, after the exchange of Party cards, it is essential to steer a course—from the very beginning—towards placing high demands on every communist. In order to transform the policy of the Party into reality we need cadres who understand the Party line correctly, and are capable of carrying it out in their sectors always consistently and creatively.

Only on the basis of a high-principled cadre policy can the Party achieve a higher level in all its work, achieve responsible posts going to people ideologically firm, high principled, enjoying esteem and authority in their surroundings both for the firmness of their

socialist conviction and their moral quality, and also for the necessary ability to direct, and their knowledge. In this, we have a great debt from the past, and it will not be easy to repay it.

Well-tried and tested Leninist demands—communist idealism and class principledness, devotion to the Party, close connection with the people, permanent effort for increasing specialized and general knowledge, selflessness in work for socialism, orientation on everything new and progressive must again be the decisive criteria both in placing and training cadres. The Party is implementing the cadre policy in the interest of the development of socialism. In cadre shifts, which are made, we must proceed from the above-mentioned basic criteria, with the aim that the new people in responsible posts might achieve better political and professional results.

The disruption of the recent years has also affected strongly the cadre sphere in all sections. It is therefore necessary to pursue a systematic, consistent, perspective cadre policy. After long preparations, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted on November 6 this year a basic resolution on cadre and personnel work. This resolution is creating a complete system of selection, education of cadres and care for them both in Party and social, state and economic bodies.

It is necessary to consistently put into practice the resolution on cadre policy.

7. During the exchange of Party cards, the membership was annulled of many who had committed serious mistakes, but who in future intend to apply for membership in the Party again. A number of them want to take an active part in the implementation of the policy of the Party and are gradually disposing of their incorrect views and attitudes of the past.

There former Party members must be approached in a differentiated and individual way. It is necessary to support the development of their working activity and, according to the result of their endeavor, gradually enable them to become incorporated in public life.

8. At present we place in the forefront the importance of mass political work. An essential criterion of the effectiveness of political leadership at all levels are the results of work, the degree to which the state of things is changing for the better, how the measures towards rectifying various abuses in life are being implemented, how justified interests of the citizens are being satisfied. On the basis of the consolidation program and in the course of its implementation, the Party has created favorable conditions for the gradual renewal of the values of socialism and its perspectives in the minds of the working people. If we are to speed up the process of consolidation, we must strengthen the influence of the Party on

the masses, wage a struggle for socialist awareness of the workers, farmers and the intelligentsia, to win them for an active implementation of the policy of the Party.

We cannot be satisfied with the fact that the overwhelming majority of the people in this country was and is for socialism. We must not repeat the old mistakes and live with the impression of an automatic development of socialist awareness. Most working people have linked their lives with socialism. As we are achieving successes in the consolidation policy, as they are becoming convinced about the correctness of the Party policy, they begin to support the Party. We must patiently and persistently endeavor to win over those who hesitate or who are still captives of various illusions and ideas.

However, there are also people who stand on the bank of revisionism and anti-socialism. We shall wage a determined struggle against these, we shall not permit them to introduce new confusions into our society, to undermine our socialist society by their activities and influence. We must be consistent and guided by principles in this struggle; in policy in general and in approach to individuals in particular.

The basic task of our work is to win the broad masses of the people for the policy of the Party and its implementation. Therefore, politico-organization work among the people, as we said it in the Standpoint, is the main task of every communist, of all Party organizations and Party bodies. A sensitive approach to the working people, close connection of the Party with the people, must again become one of the basic principles of the policy of the Party. Gottwald's slogan, "Facing the masses," is now, after the exchange of Party cards, assuming a very topical significance. At the beginning we had to form first the functionaries' Party active. Now it is not sufficient to work only with the active. The point is to achieve important changes in the minds and attitudes of the working people.

The mainstay of all our policy is the working class. With its position in production, with its revolutionary traditions, its objective interest in the development of socialism, the working class is the leading class of socialist society. The most important thing for strengthening and developing socialism in this country is to achieve that the working class—especially in big industrial centers—stands firmly behind the policy of the Party, and with its work, discipline, its attitudes and views influences the whole society in the socialist spirit. Political work of communists in factories is at the present time a decisive factor in the struggle of the Party for the masses. Care for and interest in the requirements of the workers, the development of their working initiative, their real participation in the

work of the Party, the representative bodies of the state and social organizations must come to the fore in our attention. The great initiative in factories, socialist competition and the economic results show how the policy of the Party is winning support in the ranks of the working class.

The closest ally of the working class is the class of cooperative farmers, who have gone over to the road of building socialism and are thus making a considerable contribution to political consolidation as well as to the prosperity of our socialist economy. It is necessary to constantly strengthen the ties between the working class and cooperative farmers as the class basis of the political power in our state.

It is the task of communists to win over the masses of the working people in agriculture for the policy of the Party, to devote increased attention to the requirements and tasks of this very important sector of our society and economy.

We must do everything in order to win all honest members of the intelligentsia for the policy of our workers', socialist state. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has also dealt particularly with this question recently, and adopted certain measures. We know well that a relatively considerable part of the intelligentsia was under the influence of various radical, aggressive groups of rightists, who were for the most part recruited from its own ranks. This makes the struggle in this sector the more difficult and complex. A part of the intelligentsia has remained true to the Marxist-Leninist line of the Party and is working in its ranks. A considerable part has found its bearings, and is supporting the policy of the Party.

It is in the interest of the working class and the Party to win all honest members of the intelligentsia for our policy. We hold in great esteem the skilled creative work of our engineers, technicians, economists, doctors, teachers, scientists and the other strata of the intelligentsia. We proffer a hand to everyone who wants to contribute with his work to the building of socialism. However, drawing a lesson from bitter experience, we shall not—and cannot—take the road of unprincipled compromise, political-ideological concessions.

The attention which we are devoting to the restoration of normal life in the Party, the restoration of its Marxist-Leninist character, is due in the first place to the fact that we must fully ensure that the Communist Party is able to implement effectively in all spheres of the life of the society the tasks stemming from its mission of the leading force of socialist society. Here too, we are drawing on the lessons of the past. The point now is to go over from solving immediate tasks of the power struggle and purification to the strug-

gle for the full political and ideological isolation of rightist opportunist forces, to overcoming the destruction of socialist values in the minds of the people, to putting through the principles on which rests the social system of socialism and relations among people.

The specific tasks of economic and social development, organizational and cultural work are thus assuming marked class, political features. The emphatic solution of topical questions of social development, effective development of socialist democracy for the broad masses of the working people, a permanent rise in the economy and the satisfaction of the requirements of the working people, support to scientific-technical development, represent an important part of the struggle against the right wing. This is the road of liquidating the remnants of its influence and of preventing in future the reproduction of social, political, economic and ideological factors on which it was relying in its onslaught. This is the road of achieving the conviction of the broad masses according to their own experiences, that the policy of the Party corresponds to their interests and requirements.

IV

9. We have said many times before that we are building a socialist society in this country for all working people. A political expression of the alliance of workers, farmers and the other strata of the working people is the National Front, with the Communist Party as the leading force, in which the other political parties and big mass organizations associating millions of politically unaffiliated working people are represented. Through the bodies of the National Front, political parties and mass organizations the working people are participating in the creation and implementation of policy in this country, in managing public life, the society, economy and the entire state, which is a part of our socialist democracy. Greater attention must be devoted to the work of the National Front, its components and especially to mass organizations. When speaking about mass political work of communists, this is primarily valid for work in big organizations.

Our Party must devote increased efforts mainly to the work of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement and the new organization of our youth—the Socialist Union of Youth and the Young Pioneer organization.

The operation of right-wing revisionist and anti-socialist forces in the trade union movement and in the organization of our youth was exceptionally harmful, and there are difficulties in overcoming politically and organizationally the heritage of this disruptive activity.

A great deal of work has been done in the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement since April 1969, especially in the cleansing of leading bodies, and for the restoration of the Leninist concept of trade unions in a socialist state. However, we cannot become self-satisfied over these results. Even today there are forces at many places of work, in works committees and in local branches, which were considerably compromised in the years 1968-1969. What is most important, however: right at the places of work, in factories and elsewhere, the straight-forward, political-educational and organizational work of trade union organizations is still not felt sufficiently. The shortcomings in the work of the trade union movement have an influence also on the working results of individual sectors. It is necessary to put before the communists in trade union bodies at all levels a very exacting program of activating the trade union movement in the direction of the Leninist trade union policy and to draft this program down to works organizations. We know that certain measures are already being taken in this respect. It seems, however, that the entire great mechanism of the trade union movement is rather sluggishly reaching its main working sphere, i.e., the factories and working places.

Party organizations in factories and in other places of work should help trade union organizations in completing the cleansing of individual bodies, and particularly in activating the trade union movement. Trade union organizations should take upon themselves their share of responsibility for the further development of political and economic consolidation, to lead its organizations and all working people consistently along this line. The trade union movement has immense tasks and possibilities in this sphere. It is necessary to overcome to the full extent the rightist deformities of the years 1968-1969, when trade unions were often placed in opposition to the Party and to socialism. It is necessary to develop further working initiative and activity, to insist on the strengthening of working discipline, to combat all disorders and slapdash work in production and in places of work, the misuse of the advantages of the socialist order, the selfishness of persons and sometimes enterprises, to explain the all-society interest and its importance for the working class and all the working people.

Competition must be placed on an informal basis. Very positive results have been reported from many places of work. We know that these are only the beginnings, that we have immense possibilities to achieve gradually much greater political and economic successes through political and organizational work. In factories and in places of work trade unions are important assistants of the Party in the effort for the consolidation of the situation and for the further development of the economy. Proportionately to this, it is necessary

also to improve the work of the entire Revolutionary Trade Union Movement.

Our Party is devoting exceptional attention to youth and wants to devote even more attention to it. By the political and vocational preparation of the young generation, the socialist society is securing its own future. Right wing opportunists and anti-socialist forces grossly abused a part of the young generation with demagogic slogans and campaigns. We must therefore work out a complex of measures that will help the younger generation to orientate itself correctly in our development as well as perspectively help the young people in preparing for practical work. The complex of measures must concern the care of the Party, trade unions and other mass organizations, all kinds of schools, state and economic bodies, national committees, physical culture organizations, the work of mass communications media, arts, culture, etc., so that the concentrated, well-thought-out care for the maturing generation and the concentration of public and state means will bring positive results. We shall be dealing shortly with these questions in a more complex way.

We regard it as an important political success that a unified youth organization—the Socialist Union of Youth and the Young Pioneer Organization, which advocate socialist ideals and want to influence young people in this direction and educate them—has been rebuilt in this country. The Socialist Union of Youth has a great future and a great mission. It is necessary for Party organizations at all levels to deal regularly and systematically with the problems of the younger generation and give them assistance especially through the Socialist Union of Youth and the Young Pioneer Organization, in organizational and working matters, in the selection of cadres, in seeking the most suitable forms of the work of youth organizations.

From our youth we expect that they will place their élan, energy and enthusiasm at the service of the great cause of the development of the socialist society, that they will everywhere—in factories, in the fields, in schools and in research institutes—take an active share in building our homeland.

The interest of young people must be aroused by work and responsibility in Party bodies, in trade unions and the other mass organizations, in national committees and at all levels of our public and economic life. Young people must be given an opportunity to assert themselves at work in factories and at other places of work, so that their new élan might help us solve problems, so that young people may acquire practical experience more quickly, and find scope for their self-assertion. In this it is necessary to change the approach to young people, and show them confidence not only in words but also in practice.

A positive role in the struggle with right wing and anti-socialist forces in the consolidation effort has been played by the Union of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship, mainly in strengthening fraternal relations between our nations and the nations of the Soviet Union. The positive turn in public opinion in the sense of strengthening our friendship was to a certain extent also the merit of the Union of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship. Results have been apparent on many occasions, for the last time in connection with mass actions during the Days of Soviet Culture. The sincere and friendly attitude of our people towards the Soviet Union and the Soviet people is being widely restored. We appreciate this work and shall support the activity of the Union of Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship for promoting Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship in the broad masses of the people and mainly among non-Party members.

I should like to devote at least a few words to the work and attitudes of our women. We highly value their working contribution in various sectors of our economy and society, their sacrifices and contribution in bringing up the young generation and, last but not least, their support for the consolidation effort of our Party.

We still have a great debt in making the conditions of the working woman easier. It is necessary to create conditions for women to be able to take an even more active part than hitherto in the work of Party, trade union, social, state, representative and economic bodies and so make their contribution towards a faster solution of problems, especially applicable to employed women and mothers.

Comrades,

10. In the course of the consolidation process we devoted much effort and energy to the strengthening of our socialist state, to cleansing and improving the activity of its bodies. We may say that today the Party has restored its leading role in this important field, that our state is fulfilling the basic functions of workers' power, that this power is again firm and that we shall not allow anyone to weaken or threaten it again.

A positive evaluation can be made of the political and working consolidation of our people's army and the security corps. These important bodies of power have been cleansed from opportunistic forces and are today a firm support of our socialist system.

We need a calm atmosphere for our work, people must have the assurance that the results of their work will not be abused, that laws are valid and will be valid in this society, that they may rely on the firmness of our system. This is why we are trying to have reliable organs of socialist power and we must see to it that they fulfil their functions and that their activity is strictly governed by our laws. This concerns both the protection of the rights of our

the masses, wage a struggle for socialist awareness of the workers, farmers and the intelligentsia, to win them for an active implementation of the policy of the Party.

We cannot be satisfied with the fact that the overwhelming majority of the people in this country was and is for socialism. We must not repeat the old mistakes and live with the impression of an automatic development of socialist awareness. Most working people have linked their lives with socialism. As we are achieving successes in the consolidation policy, as they are becoming convinced about the correctness of the Party policy, they begin to support the Party. We must patiently and persistently endeavor to win over those who hesitate or who are still captives of various illusions and ideas.

However, there are also people who stand on the bank of revisionism and anti-socialism. We shall wage a determined struggle against these, we shall not permit them to introduce new confusions into our society, to undermine our socialist society by their activities and influence. We must be consistent and guided by principles in this struggle; in policy in general and in approach to individuals in particular.

The basic task of our work is to win the broad masses of the people for the policy of the Party and its implementation. Therefore, politico-organization work among the people, as we said it in the Standpoint, is the main task of every communist, of all Party organizations and Party bodies. A sensitive approach to the working people, close connection of the Party with the people, must again become one of the basic principles of the policy of the Party. Gottwald's slogan, "Facing the masses," is now, after the exchange of Party cards, assuming a very topical significance. At the beginning we had to form first the functionaries' Party active. Now it is not sufficient to work only with the active. The point is to achieve important changes in the minds and attitudes of the working people.

The mainstay of all our policy is the working class. With its position in production, with its revolutionary traditions, its objective interest in the development of socialism, the working class is the leading class of socialist society. The most important thing for strengthening and developing socialism in this country is to achieve that the working class—especially in big industrial centers—stands firmly behind the policy of the Party, and with its work, discipline, its attitudes and views influences the whole society in the socialist spirit. Political work of communists in factories is at the present time a decisive factor in the struggle of the Party for the masses. Care for and interest in the requirements of the workers, the development of their working initiative, their real participation in the

work of the Party, the representative bodies of the state and social organizations must come to the fore in our attention. The great initiative in factories, socialist competition and the economic results show how the policy of the Party is winning support in the ranks of the working class.

The closest ally of the working class is the class of cooperative farmers, who have gone over to the road of building socialism and are thus making a considerable contribution to political consolidation as well as to the prosperity of our socialist economy. It is necessary to constantly strengthen the ties between the working class and cooperative farmers as the class basis of the political power in our state.

It is the task of communists to win over the masses of the working people in agriculture for the policy of the Party, to devote increased attention to the requirements and tasks of this very important sector of our society and economy.

We must do everything in order to win all honest members of the intelligentsia for the policy of our workers', socialist state. The Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has also dealt particularly with this question recently, and adopted certain measures. We know well that a relatively considerable part of the intelligentsia was under the influence of various radical, aggressive groups of rightists, who were for the most part recruited from its own ranks. This makes the struggle in this sector the more difficult and complex. A part of the intelligentsia has remained true to the Marxist-Leninist line of the Party and is working in its ranks. A considerable part has found its bearings, and is supporting the policy of the Party.

It is in the interest of the working class and the Party to win all honest members of the intelligentsia for our policy. We hold in great esteem the skilled creative work of our engineers, technicians, economists, doctors, teachers, scientists and the other strata of the intelligentsia. We proffer a hand to everyone who wants to contribute with his work to the building of socialism. However, drawing a lesson from bitter experience, we shall not—and cannot—take the road of unprincipled compromise, political-ideological concessions.

The attention which we are devoting to the restoration of normal life in the Party, the restoration of its Marxist-Leninist character, is due in the first place to the fact that we must fully ensure that the Communist Party is able to implement effectively in all spheres of the life of the society the tasks stemming from its mission of the leading force of socialist society. Here too, we are drawing on the lessons of the past. The point now is to go over from solving immediate tasks of the power struggle and purification to the strug-

gle for the full political and ideological isolation of rightist opportunist forces, to overcoming the destruction of socialist values in the minds of the people, to putting through the principles on which rests the social system of socialism and relations among people.

The specific tasks of economic and social development, organizational and cultural work are thus assuming marked class, political features. The emphatic solution of topical questions of social development, effective development of socialist democracy for the broad masses of the working people, a permanent rise in the economy and the satisfaction of the requirements of the working people, support to scientific-technical development, represent an important part of the struggle against the right wing. This is the road of liquidating the remnants of its influence and of preventing in future the reproduction of social, political, economic and ideological factors on which it was relying in its onslaught. This is the road of achieving the conviction of the broad masses according to their own experiences, that the policy of the Party corresponds to their interests and requirements.

IV

9. We have said many times before that we are building a socialist society in this country for all working people. A political expression of the alliance of workers, farmers and the other strata of the working people is the National Front, with the Communist Party as the leading force, in which the other political parties and big mass organizations associating millions of politically unaffiliated working people are represented. Through the bodies of the National Front, political parties and mass organizations the working people are participating in the creation and implementation of policy in this country, in managing public life, the society, economy and the entire state, which is a part of our socialist democracy. Greater attention must be devoted to the work of the National Front, its components and especially to mass organizations. When speaking about mass political work of communists, this is primarily valid for work in big organizations.

Our Party must devote increased efforts mainly to the work of the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement and the new organization of our youth—the Socialist Union of Youth and the Young Pioneer organization.

The operation of right-wing revisionist and anti-socialist forces in the trade union movement and in the organization of our youth was exceptionally harmful, and there are difficulties in overcoming politically and organizationally the heritage of this disruptive activity.

A great deal of work has been done in the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement since April 1969, especially in the cleansing of leading bodies, and for the restoration of the Leninist concept of trade unions in a socialist state. However, we cannot become self-satisfied over these results. Even today there are forces at many places of work, in works committees and in local branches, which were considerably compromised in the years 1968-1969. What is most important, however: right at the places of work, in factories and elsewhere, the straight-forward, political-educational and organizational work of trade union organizations is still not felt sufficiently. The shortcomings in the work of the trade union movement have an influence also on the working results of individual sectors. It is necessary to put before the communists in trade union bodies at all levels a very exacting program of activating the trade union movement in the direction of the Leninist trade union policy and to draft this program down to works organizations. We know that certain measures are already being taken in this respect. It seems, however, that the entire great mechanism of the trade union movement is rather sluggishly reaching its main working sphere, i.e., the factories and working places.

Party organizations in factories and in other places of work should help trade union organizations in completing the cleansing of individual bodies, and particularly in activating the trade union movement. Trade union organizations should take upon themselves their share of responsibility for the further development of political and economic consolidation, to lead its organizations and all working people consistently along this line. The trade union movement has immense tasks and possibilities in this sphere. It is necessary to overcome to the full extent the rightist deformities of the years 1968-1969, when trade unions were often placed in opposition to the Party and to socialism. It is necessary to develop further working initiative and activity, to insist on the strengthening of working discipline, to combat all disorders and slapdash work in production and in places of work, the misuse of the advantages of the socialist order, the selfishness of persons and sometimes enterprises, to explain the all-society interest and its importance for the working class and all the working people.

Competition must be placed on an informal basis. Very positive results have been reported from many places of work. We know that these are only the beginnings, that we have immense possibilities to achieve gradually much greater political and economic successes through political and organizational work. In factories and in places of work trade unions are important assistants of the Party in the effort for the consolidation of the situation and for the further development of the economy. Proportionately to this, it is necessary

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From our youth we expect that they will place their élan, energy and enthusiasm at the service of the great cause of the development of the socialist society, that they will everywhere—in factories, in the fields, in schools and in research institutes—take an active share in building our homeland.

The interest of young people must be aroused by work and responsibility in Party bodies, in trade unions and the other mass organizations, in national committees and at all levels of our public and economic life. Young people must be given an opportunity to assert themselves at work in factories and at other places of work, so that their new élan might help us solve problems, so that young people may acquire practical experience more quickly, and find scope for their self-assertion. In this it is necessary to change the approach to young people, and show them confidence not only in words but also in practice.

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I should like to devote at least a few words to the work and attitudes of our women. We highly value their working contribution in various sectors of our economy and society, their sacrifices and contribution in bringing up the young generation and, last but not least, their support for the consolidation effort of our Party.

We still have a great debt in making the conditions of the working woman easier. It is necessary to create conditions for women to be able to take an even more active part than hitherto in the work of Party, trade union, social, state, representative and economic bodies and so make their contribution towards a faster solution of problems, especially applicable to employed women and mothers.

Comrades,

10. In the course of the consolidation process we devoted much effort and energy to the strengthening of our socialist state, to cleansing and improving the activity of its bodies. We may say that today the Party has restored its leading role in this important field, that our state is fulfilling the basic functions of workers' power, that this power is again firm and that we shall not allow anyone to weaken or threaten it again.

A positive evaluation can be made of the political and working consolidation of our people's army and the security corps. These important bodies of power have been cleansed from opportunistic forces and are today a firm support of our socialist system.

We need a calm atmosphere for our work, people must have the assurance that the results of their work will not be abused, that laws are valid and will be valid in this society, that they may rely on the firmness of our system. This is why we are trying to have reliable organs of socialist power and we must see to it that they fulfil their functions and that their activity is strictly governed by our laws. This concerns both the protection of the rights of our

citizens and of the socialist order, so that society should not be threatened by the anti-social and anti-socialist activity of various elements and that the interests of the whole society might be duly protected.

It is important for the bodies of socialist power to work so as to strengthen the positive relationship of our citizens to our socialist institutions. The execution of state power and administration must be such as to strengthen socialist relations and at the same time strengthen in the people the awareness of their duties and rights as citizens of the socialist state.

The socialist state has an important organizational and educational function, and the representative corps and the executive apparatus must work accordingly. It is necessary to stress their political role and high responsibility to the Party and society for the neutralizing of the demagoguery of the right wingers who placed the deputies in opposition to Party bodies. I am also mentioning this here because the resolution of the Presidium on improving the political work of the deputies of representative bodies is so far being brought to life only slowly.

We attach great importance to the work of national committees. Now, after the cleansing it is necessary to substantially improve the quality of their political and organizational work. We know that many difficulties have an objective character. On the other hand, however, there is much, too much, disorder and negligence which people are rightly pointing out. But the national committees connive at this state of affairs, although it is within their power, capacity and jurisdiction to set things right, all the more so as these are often seemingly petty things which, however, make the life of the working people unpleasant and damage the authority of our state.

All our appeals to responsibility and order will be in vain if we do not ensure the good quality and efficient work of our governments, individual ministries and all those managing links which depend on it. It cannot be denied that the objective nature of our tasks raises the demand of making higher claims and requiring from all workers of central bodies a standard of work that safeguards the implementation of the policy and the objectives of the Party in the given sector.

The struggle against disintegrating tendencies, uncontrolled development and anarchy, which were and are fertile soil for opportunism, comes to the forefront as the basic task common to all state bodies; to apply in practice principles of socialist organization, discipline, record keeping and control, the combating of corruption, speculation, pilfering, slapdash work and irresponsibility; to restore socialist moral values and high responsibility to society. Honest

working people are daily provoked by cases of speculative money making, untaxed incomes from work on the side, unauthorized manipulation with social ownership and many other demoralizing and parasitic phenomena on the fringe of our society. State bodies, national committees and especially committees of people's control must substantially improve and intensify their work in the struggle for socialist order, against petty-bourgeois relics.

It will now be necessary to rationalize the state apparatus step by step, remove from its work bureaucratism, increase its efficiency. It is up to communists in the respective bodies to implement this task, to see that the state apparatus fulfils its duties as a service to the working class and all working people.

11. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is the common state of the Czech and the Slovak nations and on its territory live also other nationalities—Ukrainian, Hungarian, Polish and German. This sphere of nationality relations in our state has always been and is to this day a sensitive one. The requirements of an advanced socialist state must therefore be realized in a way that accords with the interests of the working class and the working people of the two nations and at the same time provides possibilities for full implementation of the development of both nations. Unsolved questions in the relations between our nations, surviving from the previous period, have been adjusted according to Leninist teachings on the nationality question by the constitutional act on the Czechoslovak Federation. After two years of experience we can say that the enforcement of this law has been an important positive act, that it has contributed towards overcoming tension and also had a positive influence on strengthening our state in the crisis period. The two year's experience with the federative arrangement of our state is positive, it can be said that it had stood the test of practice.

These experiences, however, have revealed also some partial shortcomings. That is why the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party agreed, after long and specialized preparation, after debate in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, in the bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia for directing Party work in the Czech lands, in the federal and the national governments, to certain amendments of the law on the Federation and laws linking up with it which are to strengthen the uniform management of the state, strengthen the position of the federal government, mainly in the sphere of economy.

A written report on these changes to be debated by the Federal Assembly later this month has been submitted to the Central Committee. These changes do not concern the fundamentals of the federation which remains preserved as the correct Leninist idea

and which the Party wants to preserve and improve in our social order also in the future.

Comrades,

12. A special report on economic questions will be given by Comrade Strougal. I shall limit myself only to notes which are connected with political and economic tasks.

Developments after May of last year clearly demonstrated the correctness of the road we have chosen in order to avoid the threatening economic catastrophe. The energetic measures against uncontrolled development and speculation, for the renewal of central management and planning, for overcoming destruction and introducing order into the economy have brought positive results.

We could state already at the previous plenary meetings, and today we can confirm anew that the consolidation process has a rising tendency also in the economy. Irrefutable facts prove that it was faster than many had expected. The inflationary development was overcome, especially in retail prices and incomes of the population; the home trade and the monetary development became stabilized, the dynamic of the growth of industrial and building production was restored, fully based on the growth of labor productivity; correct relationships have appeared between the creation and the utilization of the national income, between the growth of earnings and labor productivity.

When taking into consideration how profound was the destruction which our economy reached by April 1969, and how complicated is the period in which its consolidation is taking place, when considering that we were carrying it out under conditions of a sharp political struggle, against fierce resistance of right wing forces and representatives of revisionist concepts, at a time when we were at the same time implementing also an extensive change in managing cadres—we are justified in saying that the achieved results represent an important economic success and a great political victory of the Party. No reasonable person can deny it.

The broad masses of the working people are becoming convinced from their own experiences that the road of uncontrolled development, inflation and speculation is not a guarantee of their existential security. It is the road of planned development and creative work.

In the development of working initiative—I want to mention at least the example of miners and agricultural workers—the Party sees a concrete expression of approval of the course undertaken and a guarantee that we shall find the support of honest working people in our effort to solve burning problems of our economy consistently, though maybe sometimes by unpopular measures.

We take fully into consideration that we have solved the first task—to overcome the direct threat of economic disintegration—and that much effort and time will be necessary for full economic consolidation. Therefore we must not succumb to self-satisfaction, to underestimation of the difficulties, risks and the complicated nature of the tasks which are awaiting us and which we must solve without the necessary reserves.

First of all the point is that the present state of our economy reflects the whole complexity of problems of the preceding development, along with the consequences of the development in the year 1968 and the beginning of 1969. This concerns mainly problems of the unsatisfactory structure of our production, its relatively low technical standard and effectiveness. Great effort is needed in renewing the dynamics of economic growth to face up actively to the danger that the chronic negative tendencies and elements of imbalance stemming from the mentioned shortcomings might reproduce themselves. It is understandable that the long-lasting causes of low effectiveness and small adaptability of production to requirements can be solved only gradually.

For example, to be able to overcome today's considerable difficulties in fuel and electric power supplies, caused by an incorrect approach to coal mining since the mid-sixties, which climaxed in 1968, by discontinuing smooth-running construction since 1967 and an incorrect conception in the development of nuclear power production, it will be necessary throughout the entire forthcoming Five-Year-Plan period to exert much effort, apply strict fuel and power economy and expend considerable means, which will naturally be missing elsewhere. The heritage which the previous policy has left to us will not be easy to overcome even here.

It has not been possible thus far to cope adequately with the sphere of investments, the supplier-customer relations and the sphere of foreign trade. Internal reserves of economic growth, based on a better organization of production and work, on the utilization of scientific-technical progress and international socialist integration, have been hitherto mobilized only to a small extent. This task is now facing us.

We considered it correct that the main tasks of the economic plan for 1971 be first discussed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and later be laid down by a law of the Federal Assembly. I think that the practice which we are beginning today, that the annual plan will be discussed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Federal Assembly, will strengthen the authority of these bodies and the annual plan itself.

The main task of the Party in the economy now lies basically

in the following: an all-round and energetic expansion of the results achieved in the consolidation process, purposefully solving the accumulated long-term problems of the economy and drawing up a long-term strategy for economic growth.

We shall consider also in future the stability of the internal market to be the basic part of consolidation, so that after the general balance we might reach a balance in the particular ranges of products and a sufficient supply of good-quality goods in medium and low price categories. It would be incorrect to solve other problems of the economy at the expense of the stability of the home market. We cannot promise that all shortcomings and problems in supplies will be removed at once. But it should be demanded all the more resolutely that trade and production solve more flexibly those problems which can be solved, that they pursue a more active trade policy.

In economic policy we must more resolutely than hitherto wage a struggle in all factories and enterprises for making good use of the working time, for working and technological discipline. Party organizations must stand at the head of this struggle, give support to leading officials who apply the policy of high demands in practice and, on the other hand, oppose people who condone shortcomings. We would not be pursuing a communist policy if we became reconciled to the fact that quite a big part of the increment of the national income is being wasted in the growing number of incompleting projects and undesirable reserves, that due to disorders and lack of discipline, ill-considered approaches and mistakes in management, machines and plans are not being used properly and considerable losses are arising in all sectors. Certain workers, both in production and in the managing posts will have to be told frankly: for the wage or the salary you are drawing you must return better, more responsible work or even more work.

Together with this it is necessary to pass over from mere declarations on the inevitability of socialist rationalization to an effective practical implementation of rationalization of work, production, management and administration, to achieve a more effective utilization of basic funds, raw materials, power, manpower and reserves.

We attach exceptional importance to the strengthening of the role of the perspective plan, to the application of prognoses in managing activity. The ten years during which the national economy was practically living from year to year have been a sufficient lesson for us. In this respect we regard the demands for a timely and high-quality completion of the Five-Year Plan and the strengthening of perspectives of management in general as a task of first-rate importance. However, it is necessary to underline the

demand to concentrate forces on the main links. Giving way to local pressures, to partial demands, sometimes even justified, would mean that again we shall not be able to solve anything thoroughly. This must be understood by Party bodies and organizations, the respective leading officials in economic bodies and national committees, whose demands — mainly for investments — it will not be possible to cover to the full extent.

Our economy provides real possibilities for fulfilling the tasks that have been laid down. For this, however, it is essential to substantially improve the quality of managerial work including improvement of our system of management. Since there are still certain obscurities on this question, I should like to recall once again that the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia regards it as correct and necessary in the work for improving the socialist system of management to link up with the principles which the Central Committee adopted in 1965 and which were then confirmed by the 13th congress. These principles must be cleansed of revisionist residues, considerably and soberly developed on the basis of experience which we have gained ourselves, and of experience gained by the other socialist countries, especially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Stability and certainty must be brought into the entire economic apparatus now, after the cleansing. Party organizations are to create a political atmosphere which will aid towards this aim. The quality of the work of the economic apparatus is to a considerable extent influenced by a correct cadre policy. The objectively necessary tasks of cleansing, which have been basically fulfilled, meant a one-time cadre movement which has no parallel since 1948. It is evident how important this movement is from the point of view of continuity of management and how important it is for these changes to be speedily completed, for the workers to be confirmed in their functions, for them to be given assurance and perspective in work, and at the same time that demands and control be increased. The cadre changes must result in a substantial political and specialized strengthening of the managerial apparatuses and in raising the standard of managerial work. In no case can they be justification for non-fulfilment of the tasks. In promoting cadres, the basic criterion must be high requirements both in the sense of political and professional abilities. It is necessary to orientate more on young, perspective cadres, which have the prerequisites for growth, a sense for the new and the courage to implement exacting aims.

On various occasions we have voiced our standpoint on the inclusion in work of those who have been crossed off the list of Party members. It is necessary — as long as they did not get on to

enemy positions — to make rational use of their knowledge and experiences.

It was certainly understandable that in the course of the exchange of Party cards, the Party organizations focused their attention mainly on internal tasks. Today, however, it is inevitable that questions of economic policy become a substantial component part of the activity of all Party bodies and organizations, from top to bottom, for the Party organizations to regard the application of the united economic policy of the Party in the sphere of their influence as one of their main tasks, to create political preconditions for the fulfilment of the plan and the growth of labor productivity; for them to convince and win over the working people on the basis of their objective material interest and wish for a better life, for working with initiative in implementing our economic objectives.

13. Our tasks in the ideological sphere are immense. The great political struggle which the Party is currently waging for the masses of the working people is above all a struggle for their thinking, that they should identify themselves with the policy of the Party, its program of consolidation and the further construction of an advanced socialist society. Again we have proved and confirmed through experience that politics and ideology are inseparable.

The complete defeat of rightist forces presupposes waging a systematic struggle against all forms of opportunism, against revisionist theories, against petty-bourgeois thinking and bourgeois ideology. The political defeat of rightist opportunists must be completed by their total ideological defeat, by overcoming them ideologically.

To achieve this, however, it is necessary not only to expose the activity of the individual exponents of the right, it is also necessary to expose the roots of opportunism, its historical, philosophical and socio-economic bases, the theoretical sources of revisionism. For such work we must create specialized collectives, rebuild theoretical institutions. The Central Committee will make high demands on our Party schools, primarily the Political College of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the newly-established Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

The revisionists were conspicuous for their nihilistic and cynical attitude, they besmirched the Party, the great traditions and spiritual values which the Party always defended, the awareness and morals of society, they drew people back to petty-bourgeois selfishness, to individualism, to ruthlessness in human relations, although they constantly appealed to morals and humanity.

Against this stream the Party puts the task of raising the positive values of socialism, moral resources from which the socialist man

and citizen of our country draws his certainty and perspective, his will to take an active part in and make a contribution to society, real love for one's nation and the socialist homeland, a sense of solidarity and internationalist conviction, understanding of the struggle of anti-imperialist forces in the world—these are the values for which we are fighting. We must bring it closer especially to the young generation as a basis of socialist education of the working people. The jubilee Leninist year has been an important stimulus for an energetic ideological offensive so that the world outlook of the working class, Marxism-Leninism, might have an ever stronger, determining influence in the spiritual life of our society. At the same time we must look ahead. The development of our theory is conceivable only under the condition that the theory corresponds to the new demands of practice, that it develops on the basis of generalizing the experiences of the communist movement, the popular masses. At the same time we must be vigilant towards various phrases about "modernization" of Marxist thinking, which in fact conceal a revision of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. This is not only a matter of theory. Revisionism, after all, objectively leads to the betrayal of the working class, the interest of socialism and the communist movement.

It is exceptionally important that especially schools should educate youth in the defined socialist spirit. We proceed from the fact that the teacher is the decisive person in the school. Political work with teachers of all grades of schools must be systematically in the center of attention of our Party and state bodies. Our education suffers from chronic shortcomings, which can be removed only on the basis of purposeful and highly politically qualified and specialized work.

It will be necessary to start work soon on the concept and program of development of our education, to summarize ideas, experiences and suggestions, assess them from all angles both political and professional, so that they will correspond to the requirements of the further development of our society.

The fundamental changes in the politico-ideological orientation of the content of newspapers and periodicals, the radio and television is among the great successes of our work. We have succeeded in delivering these instruments from the hands of the rightists, putting them at the service of our policy. Recently we marked the fiftieth anniversary of *Rudé Pravo*. On that anniversary we had the opportunity of recalling the history of the Party, the fact that the struggle of the Party, its victories and defeats are immediately and closely linked with the work of the communist press. We were justified in emphasizing the work, but also the great responsibility of communist journalists. We appreciate everything positive that

has been achieved over the recent period in the sphere of the mass communications media. Of course, not even this sphere is free of shortcomings. It is necessary to constantly improve both the ideological operation and the professional standard of the press, radio, television, the cinema, etc., and to devote increased attention to the cadres in this sphere.

14. In the past our Party often dealt with questions of cultural policy. It has always devoted great attention to spreading the best works of national culture and the all-round development of socialist culture. Today we are also devoting great attention and quite substantial means to the development of socialist cultural creation.

However, the cultural sphere has been for some time abused by a part of the people for political aims which are at variance with the interests of socialist society. By means of culture an attack was launched by the right wingers on the whole policy of the Party. The pressure against any social control and for absolute freedom began to have a disintegrating effect, and with it revisionist ideas were spreading, which claimed that the sphere of culture is completely autonomous and that the state has no right to interfere with it. We know the consequences to which ideas of an alleged autonomy and inviolability of the cultural sphere have led. In the end, most representatives of so-called cultural unions placed themselves at the head of various pressure groups and wanted to decide the basic questions of the policy of the Party and the state, to exclude the Party and the state from political decision-making. They abused the creative institutions and placed them against the Party and socialism.

To a certain extent the situation was similar on the scientific front, although the Party had for long years supported magnanimously and lavishly the development of the sciences. We have given a due reply to the political attack. The exposed sham politicians from the cultural and scientific front who started an open political struggle with Marxist-Leninist principles of our society are now moaning and are slandering us, saying that we suppress science and culture.

This is naturally false argumentation. Those who started the struggle against the Party and socialism, against the revolutionary power of the working class from revisionist positions, lost and were defeated. It was the revisionists that were the losers, and not science and culture. No scientific or artistic title gives anyone the right to disrupt the socialist society with impunity.

Our attitude to the support of scientific and cultural activity has in no way changed. On the contrary, we want to support it magnanimously, naturally if it works for the benefit of socialism. We cannot suffer disruption from any side, not even from individuals of the cultural and scientific front.

We approached this sphere with patience and sensitiveness, with

the exception of the aggressive right wingers. We have given artists and scientists enough time to understand the matter, to find their bearings, to become convinced about our intentions. A great part of the scientific and cultural front today supports the constructive policy of our Party.

It is now time to take a step ahead. It is time to start forming the ranks of artistic and cultural workers in a new way, to put the activity of artists' organizations and cultural institutions on a new basis, so that they help the Party and socialist society in educating a new man, a conscious creator of socialism and communism. From this aspect we are also trying to achieve by practical measures that the means which are expended on culture should yield positive values. We are of the opinion that the socialist state in which the working class is ruling, cannot allow the spreading of such works and opinions which are not only hostile to the values and ideals of socialism, but even disrupt the basic norms of ethics and morals. We are convinced that many socialist-minded artists will understand our policy, that they will support it and will commit themselves to socialist, genuinely humanistic and democratic art.

It is time to organize and form the scientific front too. Much work has already been done in the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and the Slovak Academy of Sciences and in other spheres. Honest scientific workers who want to help their people and the cause of socialism must be given scope and means for the new development of our socialist science.

15. Permit me a few words on foreign political questions. The effort to overcome the consequences of the operation of anti-socialist and rightist opportunist forces in the sphere of international relations still remains the substance of our present foreign political course. At this session of the Central Committee we are discussing the conclusions and lessons from the crisis development of recent years, in the sphere of international relations too. Permit me to quote in this connection from the submitted document:

"We are a firm part of the world socialist community. Our successes in the past and our road ahead are closely linked with the first country of the socialist revolution—the Soviet Union. Without its help we could not have solved and coped with the complicated and great tasks that the socialist development has demanded and still demands in our country. Taught by the bitter past, we shall protect like the apple of our eye the sacred behest of the progressive forces of our nations and the alliance with the Soviet Union, the guarantee of our national, social and state security."

In this spirit we were implementing the policy of the Central Committee in international relations, and it can be said that we have achieved full restoration of relations of fraternity and alliance with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal

parties, with the Soviet Union and the other allied states. This process has been successfully developing over the past six months.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is today a firm link of the Warsaw Treaty and its participants—as was shown a few days ago at the Berlin sessions—are in absolute unity and with all their weight support its vital foreign political interests. The Czechoslovak foreign policy is realistically assessing its place in international relations and, relying on firm international political guarantees, raises its voice with the aim of contributing to the solution of dangerous crisis foci of international relations, comes forward with constructive standpoints which are endeavoring to make a contribution to safeguarding peaceful development in Europe.

Above all the new dangerous elements of militarism and aggression which have been registered in the policy of the United States in recent months, cannot be passed over in silence. Despite all its promises and pledges, the USA is unleashing new aggressive acts against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It is backing quite overtly the militarist and expansionist policy of the government of Israel and instigates it. The United States is playing the role of a retarding factor in Europe too. To the honest efforts to create a system of European security and all-round peaceful cooperation, which is vitally important for the people of all European states, it responds with the provocative voice of cold war, calls for increased armament and intensification of the military potential of NATO.

The year 1970 is entering history as a period in which the question of the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the socialist countries has got into positive motion. The treaty signed in August between the USSR and the FRG has far-reaching international significance. It recognizes the present situation in Europe, the territorial integrity of all European states and the inviolability of their present frontiers, and emphasizes the principle of renunciation of the use of force and threat of force. The treaty has opened up the road to normalization between the Federal Republic of Germany and other socialist states.

The treaty signed this week on the fundamentals of normalization of relations between the Polish People's Republic and the German Federal Republic is another positive step in this direction. The definitive recognition of the western frontiers of the Polish People's Republic on the Oder and the Neisse—as laid down in Potsdam—means not only the fulfilment of the just demand of the Polish People's Republic, which is shared and supported by all socialist countries, but also an important contribution towards improving the general atmosphere in international relations for the benefit of peaceful cooperation and security in Europe. We welcome therefore the conclusion of this treaty and congratulate the Polish comrades

on the successful consummation of the negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Berlin session of the political consultative committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states highly valued the conclusion of the two treaties. Now it will be necessary for the treaties to be ratified and enforced. In this sense we spoke at the Berlin session and the Presidium of the Central Committee fully approved the course of our delegation.

Against the ratification and against the normalization of relations with the socialist countries in general, reactionary opposition still pursuing revanchist aims continues to centre in the FRG. These are supported also from without, especially by the United States.

... expect that on the road started in Moscow and Warsaw also other questions, especially the progressing establishment of equal relations between the German Democratic Republic and other countries, including the German Federal Republic, will be solved, as well as the admission of the German Democratic Republic to international organizations.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is among the countries with which the German Federal Republic intends to start negotiations on mutual relations. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic regards as the basic prerequisite of normalization the recognition of the Munich agreement as invalid from the very beginning, with all consequences resulting therefrom. It is generally known that the Munich diktat was part of a criminal plot of Nazi Germany against peace and the security of nations and that it was enforced by the threat of an aggressive war and unparalleled violation of the basic norms of international law.

For the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and its influence it is absolutely unacceptable for the so-called agreement, intended only to cover up the robbery of a substantial part of the Czechoslovak territory, which led to the crippling and subsequent occupation of Czechoslovakia, to be regarded even though temporarily, as valid. Lawlessness and crimes cannot be given out as right. Nor can it be forgotten that the Munich diktat was the immediate springboard for World War II which brought immense suffering to the nations of Europe.

The unqualified stand on the invalidity of Munich is a decisive criterion for Czechoslovakia in mutual relations, especially with the neighboring Federal Republic of Germany. It is also in the interest of all nations who were afflicted in the past by the aggression of German imperialism.

All member states supported the standpoint of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic at the Berlin session of the political consultative

committee of the Warsaw Treaty. In a joint statement they emphasized that the fulfilment of the just demand of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic regarding the Munich diktat will make a contribution towards a further improvement of the situation in Europe, and to the development of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the socialist countries.

It is known to the Central Committee of our Party that we have expressed readiness and willingness to open negotiations with the FRG on adjusting and normalizing relations. We hope that a realistic approach will prevail in the attitude of our partner and that it will be possible to remove in a constructive atmosphere the obstacles which have accumulated between us over long years.

We recommend that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia confirm the foreign political course of the Presidium of the Central Committee and approve the action of the Czechoslovak delegation at the recent talks in Berlin and with it also the documents which were adopted at the Berlin meeting.

Comrades,

When summing up briefly the results of the work since April 1969 we can say that we have liquidated not only the main positions of rightist opportunist forces, but that we have also achieved great progress in the consolidation of society. Right-wing opportunist and anti-socialist forces have now no real possibility of appearing publicly and operating on a state-wide scale in the communications media, state bodies, and even less on the Party forum.

Naturally they have not disappeared from our reality. The exponents of the right are still living here and with them various anti-socialist and anti-communist tendencies are surviving. We must watch and analyze carefully all forms of their operation and their tactics; resolutely act wherever they attempt to act, and apply sanctions where they violate our laws. At the present time the rightists are very much interested in provoking tension in the Communist Party, mistrust, nervousness, in weakening the unity of our ranks. Their intentions and efforts in this respect are completely identical with the efforts and operations of foreign anti-communist propaganda. They would like to preserve their strength at all costs and are waiting for a new opportunity. This, however, will never come. We shall consummate the defeat of the rightists in the ideological sphere too. The rightist danger continues to be the main danger and the struggle against it is the main front of our political struggle.

Systematic, exacting work of the whole Party will decide in our struggle for the thinking and the feelings of millions of people, for the full restoration of the links between the Party and the masses.

If we consistently and energetically solve today's problems, if we give our people certainty for tomorrow, from which socialist élan and conviction, the confidence of the masses in the Party will grow, if we restore the dynamic rise of our society, we shall be able to uproot all causes of the crisis.

The next stage of consolidation for which we are striving cannot mean a return to the methods of work which operated in the Party and society before the year 1968. Such mechanical returns do not exist in history, and any attempt of this kind would in fact have a retarding effect.

If we are to learn a lesson from past mistakes, it is necessary to try to understand the further progress of consolidation as an effort for an all-round strengthening of the socialist order, the whole social system of socialism in all its links, as an effort to apply the socialist principles in the life of society, Leninist norms and methods in the life of the party and its everyday activity. We must base our future work on a clear strategic orientation, on the high-principled Marxist-Leninist determination of the character of our stage and the perspectives in the development of our society.

Much will depend on how we shall now be able to introduce into the Party work the necessary system, peace and self-confidence, a style of work that will make possible a permanent link of the leading bodies and individual responsible leading functionaries with those Party bodies and organizations in which decisions are made about the actual implementation of the adopted resolutions. The point is that our Party bodies be working bodies, that comradely relations prevail among communists, that we do well in our work.

I think I need not mention how exacting these tasks are, how much effort and how many struggles will be needed for their fulfilment. It will be a struggle against opportunism in theory and practice, against unprincipled retreating before problems, against conciliation with shortcomings, against the force of petty-bourgeois spontaneity, against all sources from which the revisionist wave drew its strength.

Comrades,

At the close of the complicated year 1970, filled with work, our Central Committee can say with full responsibility that our Party, the working class and the working people have achieved in the course of the year valuable victories and successes in the political and economic sphere, that we are successfully overcoming crisis phenomena, strengthening the Party and the socialist society.

From these experiences stems also our confidence and certainty that we shall master also other tasks which are facing us, so that we may hold the regular 14th congress of the Party in the course of next year.

Relying on the links of fraternity and alliance with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, on the unity of our Party, on the confidence and support of the working class and the working people, we shall march firmly ahead in the further development of socialist society towards a contented and happy life for our people.

I am deeply convinced that this plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia will confirm the unity of our supreme body between congresses in the basic questions and will be an important stage in developing the course of the Party started in April 1969.

RESOLUTION ON TOPICAL QUESTIONS OF PARTY UNITY

The fifty-year history of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the experience of the international communist movement and the lessons drawn from the crisis development in the Party and society after the 13th congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia confirm that the Party can fulfil its historical role to lead the revolutionary proletariat, to overthrow the exploiting classes with the support of the working people, to be the leading political force in the construction of socialism, to foresee the development of society, to elaborate a correct political line and to consistently implement it only under the conditions of Marxist-Leninist political, ideological and organizational unity. This unity is the source of its strength, the expression of its responsibility to the working class and other working people, as well as the prerequisite of the Party's firm ties with the people.

The difficult tests we have gone through recently have again shown how dearly our socialist society had to pay for the disruption of the Party's unity.

In the period of 1968-1969, the Marxist-Leninist forces waged a struggle against the disrupters of the Party's unity and defended principled Marxist-Leninist unity. The right wing was politically defeated in this struggle. The Party parted ways with it organizationally during the exchange of Party cards. In the clash with the right wing, the Party unified its views, strengthened itself organizationally and improved its tactical course.

The Party must deepen and develop the unity which was being created in a difficult and complicated struggle, while fully and consistently implementing the statutes, guard like the apple of its eye the cohesion of Party ranks and not allow its revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist and internationalist character to be weakened.

* * *

The right wing, which has not reconciled itself with its defeat, continues to represent the main political danger. Its aims have not changed. It is serving anti-communist strategic designs of imperialism striving for the disruption of the Party and socialism from within. However, it has changed its tactics:

—It conceals its guilt by insincerity, attempts to continue deceiving and strives to maintain its influence;

—After the loss of its positions of power, it speculates with the vestiges of its anti-socialist influence on the consciousness of people, orientates itself on taking advantage of our difficulties and magnifies them, creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and mutual suspicion, throws doubt upon the course taken and disparages the political and economic results;

—It relies on various international difficulties, from which it expects impulses for its new subversive activities. It therefore revives and spreads anti-Sovietism which it continues to regard as its main weapon.

An effective struggle against rightist opportunism and revisionism presupposes a long-term conception of active political and ideological work of the Party, which must be purposefully concentrated on:

—Overcoming rightist opportunist attitudes, revisionist theories, petty-bourgeois ideology and consistent exposure of the roots of the rightist platform;

—Measures which will effectively frustrate the efforts of the right wing to gain ideological and power positions, and to prevent it organizationally from influencing public opinion;

—Overcoming shortcomings in the construction of socialism, and in the work of Party, state, economic and social bodies and organizations;

—Consistent care of the purity of Party ranks, blocking any penetration of alien elements into the Party, and definitely strengthening the working-class character of the Party. Care of Marxist-Leninist development is a binding norm for every Party body and organization.

The struggle with the right wing must be waged in a manner that strengthens Party unity and creates firm foundations for permanent development of the activity of the whole Party and, under its leadership, of all working people. This requires that every communist proceed consistently from the Leninist content of Party unity:

—As an ideological unity based on a class approach and on consistent and creative implementation of the principles of Marxism-Leninism;

—As an organizational unity expressed in an approach combining initiative and discipline to the fulfilment of Party tasks and Party statutes by Party members;

—As a political and action unity which binds all Party organizations and members to fulfil consistently the Party line contained in resolutions of the congress, the Central Committee and lower Party bodies;

—As part of the international unity, for the Party to be a firm link of the international communist movement and to be able to fulfil all its international duties and make an active contribution to the implementation of the conclusions of the Moscow Meeting of 1969.

The Party creates its ideological, organizational and action unity in everyday purposeful and organized work, in constant struggle for the revolutionary activity of the Party and the masses.

* * *

The struggle for the ideological unity of the Party, for overcoming rightist opportunism, requires all bodies and organizations and all members of the Party to carry out actively mass-political work, to master Marxism-Leninism, to overcome a liberalistic approach to the penetration of alien views, not to permit ideological compromises, to act resolutely against all expressions of bourgeois ideology, and to act always in the spirit of communist adherence to principles. In this due attention must be given to the unity of ideological and organizational work.

The deepening of organizational unity requires:

—To consistently apply the principles of democratic centralism, i.e., to respect unconditionally resolutions of higher Party bodies by lower Party bodies and organizations and all members of the Party. Not to permit arbitrary interpretation of Party resolutions. To prevent the necessary and desirable exchange of views in the creation and realization of Party resolutions from being transferred outside the Party. To overcome the practice of 'unrestricted' freedom of criticism and association outside the framework of the organizational structure of the Party. Not to permit the placing of individual interest above the interests of the Party, and the separation of rights and duties of Party members;

—To see to the development of intra-Party democracy within the terms of Party Statutes. To establish conditions for the development of the creative activity and initiative of every communist. To observe the principles of collective leadership, equality of the rights and duties of all members regardless of functions, the right

of every communist to freely voice his views on problems discussed and to submit observations to higher Party bodies up to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. To see to it that criticism has a matter-of-fact content, that it is based on the Party's adherence to principle and that it leads to the strengthening of the Party and that it is not suppressed. Each Party organ must be accountable for its work;

—To draw the necessary conclusions from the passivity of Party members, which weakens the Party's ability to act, demoralizes the Party collective, and throws bad light on the name of Party members in the eyes of the public. Proclaiming and spreading of rightist opportunist views, revisionist conceptions and anti-Soviet manifestations is incompatible with membership in the Party.

For the strengthening of Party unity, it is equally binding, together with ideological and organizational principles, to observe the procedure laid down by Party bodies:

—Failure to observe the approved procedure, whether this may be caused by impatience, petty-bourgeois radicalism, overlooking of the experience of the masses, skipping of the necessary stages, or opportunist temporizing, disrupts the action unity of the Party and is harmful.

—Failure to observe the procedure prepares the ground for the forming of groups and factional activity.

It is necessary to avoid everything that, in contradiction to the best traditions of the Party and the present policy, would play into the hands of sectarian isolation. The strength of the Party lies in its ties with the masses, in the consistent implementation of the time-proved Gottwald slogan "With face toward the masses."

Proceeding from the "Lessons drawn from the crisis development in the Party and society after the 13th congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," approved by the December session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Party must do everything for the full implementation of democratic centralism and intra-Party democracy in its work. Only thus will it be possible to fully restore the active life of Party bodies and organizations.

RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia discussed at its plenary session held on December 10 and 11, 1970:

- The lessons drawn from the crisis development in the Party and society after the 13th congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia;
- The report on the course and the results of exchange of Czechoslovak Communist Party cards in 1970;
- The report on the activities of the Presidium and the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia since the June 1970 session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee;
- The resolution on topical questions of Party unity;
- Information of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on:
 - The evaluation of economic development in the course of 1970;
 - The fundamental tasks and orientation of the economic development in 1971;
 - Preparations of the draft fifth Five-Year Plan;
 - Partial amendments to the constitutional set-up of the Czechoslovak federation.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA:

I

1. Notes that the resolution of the January 1970 plenary session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee has been fulfilled and the aims set in the Letter of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee on the exchange of Party cards have been achieved. Main credit for the successful fulfilment of this important task goes to Party bodies in regions, districts, enterprises and localities;

highly appreciates the work of the numerous Party officials who carried out the interviews with Party members;

2. Approves

- a) The report of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the main tasks of the Party after the exchange of Party cards, delivered by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Comrade G. Husak;
- b) The final report on the exchange of Party cards and the course pursued by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, expressed in the Standpoint of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee of September 18, 1970;
- c) The lessons drawn from the crisis development in the Party and society after the 13th congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia;
- d) The resolution on topical questions of Party unity.

3. Enjoins

- Party bodies and organizations of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at all levels of the Party structure to observe it in the practical activities of the Party;
- The control and auditing commissions of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at all levels of the Party structure to control the observance of the resolution and to draw conclusions against any Party member who violates it.

II

4. Takes approving note of the draft amendments to laws of the Federal Assembly on partial adjustments of the Czechoslovak federation and

Enjoins

- Communists in the Czechoslovak Government and the Federal Assembly to ensure their discussion and approval by the end of 1970.

III

5. Discussed the results of the session of the political consultative committee of the Warsaw Treaty held in Berlin on December 2, 1970;

Agrees

to the standpoint of our delegation and the adopted documents which are another valuable contribution to the strengthening of European and world peace;

Approves

the course pursued to date by Czechoslovak foreign policy and the activity in the international communist movement. Our Party will also in future strengthen and deepen its ideological and action unity with the CPSU and other communist and workers' parties and consistently proceed from Marxist-Leninist principles in fulfilling the set tasks in the worldwide struggle for the cause of socialism, progress and peace;

IV

6. Takes approving note of the report of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on cadre changes carried out on the basis of the authorization given to it by the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee's plenary session in June 1970 and confirms the decision on cadres listed in the report;

Approves

a) the release of

- Comrade Frantisek Penc from the function of secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, member of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and chairman of the agricultural commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in connection with his assignment to other duties;
- Comrade Oldrich Svestka from the function of secretary of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia;

b) The appointment of Comrade Oldrich Svestka to the function of secretary and member of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia also approved certain changes in the composition of the economic commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

7. Confirms

the expulsion of Oldrich Cernik from the ranks of members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

* * *

In connection with the conclusion of interviews on the exchange of Party cards, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia requested no further prolongation of the extraordinary authorization concerning cadre questions, which are within the competence of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

ON THE MAIN PRINCIPLES OF THE ECONOMIC PLAN FOR 1971

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia

a) Notes

That development since May last year has unequivocally proved the correctness of the course which was adopted and implemented by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in order to prevent the imminent economic catastrophe. Resolute measures against uncontrolled development and speculation have had positive results. The leading role of the Party was restored in the economy, central management and planning, which led to a halt in the inflationary development, to general stabilization of the home market and improvement of the main relations in the national economy. The social security of people as well as confidence in the firmness of our currency have increased. The principle has been consistently applied that the consolidation of the economy should not be achieved at the cost of the living standard of people, but by intensified creation of resources and by mobilization of internal reserves.

The present level of the consolidation of the national economy is an important political victory and economic success, which has been achieved by the Party in a sharp political struggle with rightist and anti-socialist forces, thanks to the selfless work of the overwhelming majority of honest working people.

However, it is impossible to succumb to self-satisfaction. Full recovery of the national economy will still require many efforts. It is therefore necessary to place substantially higher demands on management and cadres, which is the decisive prerequisite for increasing the effectiveness of our national economy and all its links;

b) Approves

The aims of the economic policy expressed in the draft State Plan of development of the Czechoslovak economy for 1971;

c) Enjoins

- Party bodies and organizations to create political prerequisites for ensuring a consistent specification and fulfilment of the tasks of the State Plan for 1971 at all levels of management and at places of work, to use the right of control of the economic

management towards ensuring the aims of the plan, requirements of the whole society and the implementation of the principles of the socialist economy; to give full political support to leading economic executives in putting through these demands;

- Communists in state and economic bodies at all levels of management to strictly observe state discipline; to be highly demanding and to require their subordinates to fulfil their tasks consistently;
 - Communists in state and economic bodies to complete and specify in time the tasks of the plan for 1971. To concentrate forces on high-quality and timely completion of the draft fifth Five-Year Plan so that it be submitted in the second quarter of 1971. In keeping with the resolution of the January 1970 plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, to intensify work connected with the concrete tasks of economic development, to extend purposefully the work for improving the system of planned management of the national economy;
 - Communists in all social organizations, especially in the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, to actively organize mass-political work in support of concrete tasks of the plan; to develop working initiative and socialist competition in honor of the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.
-

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